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Help Me Help You – Or Help Me Help You to Help Me:
A Brief Review an Analysis of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy Ponzi Scheme
Holly N. Mancl
“The public deserves exactly what it gets, no more, no less.” 1
I.

Introduction
If it takes two to tango, it takes plenty to Ponzi. Nearly one-fifth of Albanians invested in

a “guaranteed” eight-fold return in three months. 2 More than ten million Russians invested in the
MMM scheme. 3 Between 1995 and 1998, the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and
Industry exposed eighteen Ponzi-esqe operations. 4 Between 1985 and 1995, experts estimated that
roughly $750 million had been invested in Ponzi schemes. 5 In fact, “[h]onest citizens lose about
$40 billion in scams every year.” 6 As such, one may wonder, if these schemes are so
commonplace, why do investors continually fall prey to the same old con? 7 Perhaps it’s simply a

This quote is attributed to Charles Ponzi. See Charles Stein, Crimes of the Century The Ponzi Scheme; 1920 Swindler Left
Victims, Imitators, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1999, at A1 available at Lexis.
1

Robert Allen & Marshall B. Romney, Lessons from New Era – Largest, Non-profit Ponzi Scheme Fraud Committed
by Foundation for New Era Philanthropy Founder John G. Bennett, Jr. (1998), <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m4153/is_5_55/ai_54240894> (discussing the investment scandal in Albania); see also Stein, supra note 1 (“In the
mid-1990s practically everyone in Albania poured money into a series of Ponzi-style investment plans. By one
estimate, $1 billion or 25% of the poor nation’s gross national product was funneled into the plans that promised high
rates of interest and used new money to pay off early investors. When angry Albanians found out they had been
duped, they rioted in the streets and threatened to bring down the government.”).
2

Allen & Romney, supra note 2; see also Interview by Bob Edwards with Ron Chernow, Author and Business
Historian, in NPR Studio (May 24, 1995) [hereinafter Chernow Interview] (noting that the MMM Company scheme
appealed to many Rumanians and Russians because naivety and lack of sophistication regarding capitalism made
investors gullible enough to believe that their money could be doubled in six months).
3

4

Allen & Romney, supra note 2.

5

Id.

Patti S. Spencer, Money for Nothing? Scams, Fraud, and Cons, INTELLIGENCER JOURNAL, Feb. 17, 2003, at 1, available at
2003 WLNR 6944197.

6

“Con” comes from the phrase “confidence game,” and generally requires that the perpetrator gains the trust and
confidence of the victim. Id. (discussing the etymology of “con”).

7

1

part of the legacy that the infamous king of the pyramid scheme, Charles Ponzi, left behind. 8 The
question remains: how is it that John G. Bennett, Jr. (hereinafter “Bennett”) convinced more than
1,100 donors and investors to participate in the biggest charity fraud in history? 9
8

Stein, supra note 1 (“Charles Ponzi did something few other criminals – not Al Capone or Jesse James – could
manage: He got his name attached to a crime.”). See generally Chernow Interview, supra note 3 (“Mr. Ponzi was a very
imaginative Bostonian who, in 1919, came up with the ingenious idea that he would promise his friends and relatives
and other credulous investors that if they gave Mr. Ponzi their money he would be able to, within six weeks, give them
a 50 percent return on their money.”).
From 1919-1920, Charles Ponzi, an American immigrant from Italy, swindled investors by promising high
rates of return for investing in his International Reply Coupon trade business. Allen & Romney, supra note 2; Stein,
supra. Ponzi set up an office and named his operation the “Securities and Exchange Company.” Allen & Romney,
supra. Ponzi explained that by trading vouchers purchased in a country with a weak currency for postage stamps in
America, he could exchange the stamps for cash and turn a profit. Id. Ponzi’s promise to double investors’
contributions within 90 days-a 100% return-enabled him to convince 40,000 investors to deposit almost $15 million
within the eight-month duration of his scheme. Id. To many, these returns sounded too good to be true; but Ponzi
had what many conmen are blessed with-the “gift of gab.” Stein, supra. Investors poured money into Ponzi’s business,
hoping to achieve a substantially higher return on investment than offered by local banks, which offered a mere 5%
annual return. Id.
Ponzi promptly provided returns to initial investors within 45 days, word spread, and people willingly
invested more money. Id. As with all pyramid schemes, “you have to rob Peter to pay Paul, but eventually you run
out of Pauls and the whole thing collapses.” Id.; see Chernow Interview, supra note 3 (“What happens in any Ponzi
scheme is that eventually you run out of fresh suckers and the entire pyramid scheme collapses, which is exactly what
happened in 1920.”) Ponzi paid the initial investors with the funds gathered from subsequent investors. Stein, supra.
Beginning in the winter, Ponzi siphoned money for himself and was rich by spring. Id. “He bought fancy suits and
took to carrying a cane and a gold-tipped cigarette holder. He bought an expensive car and hired a chauffeur. He
brought his mother over from Italy and purchased a huge house in Lexington for his wife, Rose.” Id. In May 1920
alone, people invested $442,000. Id. “By the summer he was taking in $250,000 a day.” Id.
Skeptics began to wonder how Ponzi could afford to pay such high returns. Id. The Boston Post closely
followed Ponzi and exposed his prior criminal record, which included prison-time in Canada for swindling. Id. When
Ponzi’s public relations guy rolled over on him for an article in the Boston Post, Ponzi’s scheme came to an end. Id.
Once the scheme ended, investigators discovered that Ponzi had $7 million in liabilities and $3 million in assets, with a
mere $30 worth of postage stamps. Id. When asked about his scam, Ponzi had little remorse; he stated: “[t]he public
deserves exactly what it gets, no more, no less.” Id. Coincidentally, the Boston Post reporters who revealed the scam
“deserved” a Pulitzer Prize. Id.
9

Tony Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 27, 1997, available at
http://www.ctlibrary.com/ct/1997/october27/7tc86a.html (generally noting that New Era’s Operation is the largest
charity fraud in history). “Nonprofit experts have made the comparisons to Jim Bakker’s PTL Club scandal in the late
1980s, but the New Era case entangled many more individuals and groups.” Id.

Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker are notorious in the televangelist fraud category. The couple hosted the PTL
(Praise the Lord) Club television program. Richard N. Ostling, Enterprising Evangelism, TIME, Aug. 3, 1987, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,965155,00.html. Based in Charlotte, North Carolina, The PTL show
quickly gained popularity and shortly after its inception, more than twelve million viewers tuned in weekly. Id. As
their success continually grew, the Bakkers created their own television network and even opened an amusement park
called Heritage USA in Fort Mill, South Carolina. Id. They solicited donations and investments for a 504-room
“Grand Hotel” to be opened on the Heritage USA grounds. Robert A. Prentice, Anatomy of a Fraud: Inside the Finances
of the PTL Ministries, AM. BUS. L.J. (1993), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/415178-1.html. Mr. Bakker
enticed investors by calling investors “lifetime partners” and telling everyone that their $1,000 initial contribution
would be rewarded with annual three night/four day stays at the Grand Hotel. Id. People were forced to act quickly
because Bakker would accept only 25,000 lifetime partnerships. Id.

2

I.

Getting Back to the Basics
a. Who is John G. Bennett, Jr.?
1. The Formative Years
Born in 1937 to an alcoholic father and a homemaker mother, John G. Bennett, Jr. grew up

with modest means in Olney, Pennsylvania. 10 John G. Bennett, Sr. worked as a part-time doorto-door insurance salesman and as a laundry-truck driver during the Great Depression. 11 Bennett

In addition to selling lifetime partnerships at the Grand Hotel, Bakker also sought “partners” for the Towers
Hotel, the Family Heritage Club, and the 1100 Partnership. Id. Contributors sent the evangelicals more than $1
million in donations each week. Ostling, supra. However, even from the early days, investors were unlikely to see their
expected returns. See Prentice, supra. “Each [of the partnerships] was oversold so that lifetime members found it
virtually impossible to stay in the hotels.” Id.
Jim Bakker did, in fact, use some of the invested funds to develop the theme park and hotels, but he also
lavishly splurged on his posh lifestyle. Id. The Bakkers and other employees at PTL received extraordinary salaries.
Id. Between June 1986 and March 1987, “Jim Bakker received $1.04 million in bonuses and Tammy received $335,000
in bonuses.” Id. This amount does not take into consideration their regular salaries as PTL employees. Id. In fact,
the Bakkers had “six luxurious homes, complete with gold plated bathroom fixtures, and [even an] air conditioned
doghouse.” Id. Tammy Faye even spent $590 on a shower curtain. Id.
However, things were not all golden shower curtains and fancy make-up for the Bakkers. Id. Apparently
Jim had an affair with a church secretary, Ms. Jessica Hahn. Id. When she threatened to go public with her allegations,
Bakker offered her hush money. Id. However, when a male aide of Bakker alleged that Bakker made homosexual
advances towards him and made arrangements for homosexual rendevouz with other young males, hush money could
no longer cover the scandals. Id. The Charlotte Observer published articles with the allegations and investigated
Bakker’s business. Id. Upon investigation, many financial questions arose, and soon thereafter, Bakker’s scandal was
exposed. Id. The government indicted Bakker of taking more than $4 million from the PTL “trough” and convicted
Bakker of twenty-four counts of mail and wire fraud. Id.; Todd C. Frankel, Jim Bakker Dreams Big in Missouri, SAINT
LOUIS TODAY, Feb. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/missouristatenews/story/041C935E03A6B97A862573F1001E00
A5?OpenDocument?. Bakker was sentenced to forty-five years in prison for his misdeeds. Frankel, supra. While
imprisoned, Bakker wrote a book entitled I Was Wrong, in which he apologized to those donors he “took” in the PTL
scam. Id. After serving five years, Bakker was released. Id.
Bakker currently lives in Branson, Missouri and hosts “The Jim Bakker Show.” Id. Perhaps most amazingly
to this author is that The Jim Bakker Show is another televangelist program, and Bakker continues to solicit donations
from charitable viewers. See id. However, luckily for contributors, this time Bakker is not in charge of the accounting.
Id.
10

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (noting that Bennett’s father had a “penchant for cigars and
whiskey”).
Olney is a small town in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania with a population of about 70,000. United States
Census Bureau, 2000 Census, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/ (enter “Olney” into the location field box and
choose “Pennsylvania” from the drop down list). It is typically considered a northern suburb of Philadelphia. Id.
11

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

3

was born into a Presbyterian family, and his church provided him with the means to rise above his
impoverished upbringing by providing a $3,500 interest-free loan so he could attend college. 12
To support himself through college, Bennett worked at Philadelphia Municipal Airport for
United Airlines as a reservations clerk. 13 After college, in 1963, he began teaching chemistry at
Agnes Irwin School for Girls and began to foster his reputation as “a cultured, educated, and
most important[ly, a] socially acceptable leader.” 14 From teaching, Bennett decided to return to
school and enrolled at Temple University Medical School. 15 Bennett garnered a reputation as a
hard worker, and classmate James P. Cain, currently a physician, opined that “[Bennett] relied on
doggedness rather than a brilliance he didn’t possess.” 16 Despite his hard work, the rigors of
medical school got the best of Bennett, and halfway through his first year he took a leave of
absence for medical reasons. 17
Bennett dropped out of medical school when drug use was on the rise in the nation and
Philadelphia authorities were desperately searching for candidates to run drug abuse counseling
centers. 18

Bennett had the perfect resume for the job-he had a teaching background, understood

chemistry and drugs, and developed an authoritative, knowledgeable bedside manner while in

12

Id. Bennett attended First Presbyterian Church in Olney, Pennsylvania. Id.

13

Id. (noting that “Bennett, to introduce an aura of glamour, told college classmates his assignment was to hire pretty
stewardesses and provide special handling for celebrities”).

14

Id. Agnes Irwin School for Girls is an all girls Kindergarten through Twelfth Grade school in Rosemont,
Pennsylvania. The Agnes Irwin School ~ All-Girls Education,
http://www.agnesirwin.org/podium/default.aspx?t=21467 (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). This school prides itself on its
top-notch education and its recognition as a leading educational institution. See generally id.
15

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

16

Id. (“He adopted rigorous study habits, and his uninterrupted hours in the library earned him the nickname ‘Iron
Butt.’”).

17

Id. Bennett claimed that he left medical school because of Meniere’s disease, “a disorder causing ringing in the ears
and vertigo.” Id. He never returned to medical school following his leave of absence. Id.

18

Id.

4

medical school. 19 This transition from academia into drug-rehab center management marked the
beginning of Bennett’s career in the non-profit sector.
2. Bennett: The Philanthropist, The Fundraiser, & The Businessman
Bennett excelled at his job – “[w]ithin eight years, he had organized seven local centers for
drug-abuse intervention and education” and “was recognized as the foremost program manager in
the state [of Pennsylvania].” 20 His excellence garnered him respect and political influence within
Philadelphia’s philanthropic community. 21 Bennett quickly capitalized on his experience and
created Nova Institute International, a company in which Bennett worked as a fundraising
consultant for drug-rehab programs. 22 Shortly thereafter, Bennett took over fundraising efforts
for a drug-counselor training program at the Medical College of Pennsylvania and numerous other
organizations. 23 Compassion International of Colorado Springs also hired Bennett as a fundraiser

19

Id. While in medical school, Bennett took classes that assisted him in mastering a bedside manner that portrayed a
controlled, knowledgeable demeanor. Id.

20

Id.; see also United States v. Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d 513, 525 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (discussing Bennett’s career in the drug
abuse counseling sector); Thomas S. Giles, “Double Your Money” Scam Burns Christian Groups, CHRISTIANITY TODAY at
39 (June 19, 1995).
21

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (noting that Bennett gained such political influence that he was
appointed to the Governor’s Council on Drug and Alcohol Abuse); see also Steve Wulf, Too Good to Be True, TIME, May
29, 1995, at 34 available at GALE, Document No. A16981999 (“Cathryn Coate, executive director of the Greater
Philadelphia Cultural Alliance, says, ‘The word on the street was that Bennett was a super credible man, impeccable.
You’d hear things like, ‘Oh, I’ve known Bennett for 15 years.’ It’s not like a bunch of quick-fix guys duped a bunch of
bozos.”).
22

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

23

Id. See generally United States v. Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d 513, 525 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (discussing Bennett’s work as a financial
consultant with “Teen Challenge”). Teen Challege is an organization that focuses on assisting teenagers with their
drug abuse problems. Teen Challenge, About Us, 2007, http://teenchallengeusa.com/about.php (last visited Apr. 8,
2008).

Although Bennett quickly gained a reputation for being organized and able to raise funds, his reputation was
far from impeccable. Carnes, supra. In fact, Lawrence Snow, a psychiatrist at the Medical College of Pennsylvania,
asserted, “Bennett was well-connected with local foundations and some wealthy individuals. . . . He was always talking
about this person he knew or that foundation he might join, but after a couple of years, he quit. He raised little or no
money.” Id. Shortly after Bennett resigned as the Medical College’s fund-raising director, the fund-raising program
ended. Id.

5

in 1979. 24 Bennett’s performance in this role was sub par. 25 In fact, “[d]espite Bennett’s written
reports indicating success, Compassion was not receiving any money.” 26 Wally Erickson, former
President and current board member of Compassion stated, ‘“When I flew out there to confront
him . . . he admitted that he’d been lying—turning in falsified reports. He said he was sorry.”’ 27
“Erickson says he prayed with Bennett but terminated the relationship.” 28
Through his continuous networking and non-profit schmoozing, Bennett met numerous
wealthy individuals and community leaders. 29 Charming them with his warm personality, Bennett
took advantage of his networking connections to create new “charities.” By 1982, Bennett
founded the Center for New Era Philanthropy, which was funded in large part by wealthy
philanthropists. 30 However, Bennett’s money management skills left a bit to be desired, and soon
his lack of accounting prowess began to show.
3. Financial Trouble on the Horizon
Shortly after its creation, Nova’s business began to face financial distress. 31 In fact:
Montgomery County records reveal an unfolding financial disaster marked by unpaid
debts, outstanding business bills and tax liens. From 1981 to 1983, six federal tax
liens were filed against Nova Institute or Bennett. United Airlines and the
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue filed liens and secured judgments. In 1984,

24

Randy Frame, The ‘Post-New Era’ Era: Ministries Band Together to Overcome Losses, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 17, 1995,
at 55.
25

See id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id. Interestingly, Compassion International discussed whether to invest in New Era. Id. Erickson advised the
charity against association with Bennett but did not “warn other organizations because ‘Mr. Bennett indicated he had
undergone a spiritual conversion, so [Erickson] thought it was possible things had changed.’” Id. Erickson further
opined that “‘[t]here is a thin line between stander and fair warning.”” Id.
29

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

30

Id. Although Bennett established the Center for New Era Philanthropy in the early stages of his philanthropic
endeavors, this is a distinct entity from the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy that fronted the largest Ponzi
scheme in charity history. Id.

31

Id.

6

the IRS placed a lien against Bennett and his wife, Joyce, his childhood sweetheart,
for $29,250. 32
In addition to his financial troubles, Bennett also encountered personal problems. In 1984,
Bennett was involved in a severe car accident. 33 Desperate for help, Bennett turned to God. 34
Specifically, Bennett turned to Wayne, Pennsylvania’s Church of the Savior. 35 Church members
took care of Bennett; they helped satisfy the IRS lien and even brought food to the Bennett’s
home. 36 Once Bennett was back on his feet, he revived the Center for New Era Philanthropy and
ventured into the for-profit sector with Human Service Systems. 37 Even during these early
businesses, Bennett’s accounting was sub-par, but no one brought the potential check-kiting to
the forefront. 38
In addition to running the Center for New Era Philanthropy and Human Service Systems,
Bennett continued consulting and began training nonprofit personnel at Bell Telephone of
32

Id.

33

Id.; Man Accused in Charity Scheme Faces 82 Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1996, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E0D6123CF93BA1575AC0A960958260 (noting that Bennett
was in a car accident in 1984 causing brain damage for which he sought psychiatric treatment).

34
Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9. Bennett claimed that his spiritual renewal was based, in some part,
on God sparing his life in the car accident. Id.
35

Id. Wayne, Pennsylvania is a charming town located in Delaware County near the Randor Township. Welcome to
Wayne, Pennsylvania, http://www.waynepa.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). Coincidentally for Bennett, the Church
of the Saviour’s membership was comprised of many of Wayne County’s wealthy families. Carnes, supra. The Church
describes itself with the following statement:
Church of the Saviour was started in 1972 by a few people that wanted to be a blessing to those on
the Main Line. These men and women stepped out in faith and God began transforming their
families and friendships through the message of Jesus Christ. Our church has grown and changed
over the years. These years have shown us that we are people in need of God's love and that God is a
faithful God who cares for us and the people around us. Our desire is that we will continue to walk
in faith as those who have gone before us so that we would continue to see the love of God
transforming us, our families and our friendships.

Church of the Saviour, http://www.cosnet.org/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). This church began as a doctoral
dissertation and currently has more than 2,200 members. Wikipedia, Church of the Saviour (Wayne, Pennsylvania),
Feb. 24, 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_the_Saviour,_Wayne (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
36

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

37

Id. Human Service Systems “made mental-health service placements for employees of local businesses.” Id.

38

Id. (noting that “as early as 1987, questions emerged about possible illegal check writing”).

7

Pennsylvania “on how to manage their operations more economically.” 39 Bennett used his
position at Bell Telephone not only to network, but also to establish the Bell Institute for
Nonprofit Excellence and sponsor community prayer breakfasts. 40 The “face-time” Bennett
earned in this position raised his profile even more within Philadelphia’s philanthropic
community. 41 Bennett’s ties enabled him to meet members of the Templeton family who
supplied Bennett with the “seed money” to create the Templeton Institute for Nonprofit
Excellence. 42 “The Templeton association marked the beginning of what Bennett unshakably
believes he ha[d] been divinely called to accomplish: The contribution of his unique skills,
insights, and gifts toward helping people help others, especially in money matters.” 43 Bennett
then focused his attention on four goals: (1) “a ‘Kingdom Focus,’” (2) “meeting people’s needs,”
(3) “eliminating pain and suffering,” and (4) “‘making dreams come true.’” 44

39

Id.

40

Id. The Bell Institute of Nonprofit Excellence rewarded nonprofits that excel in their day-to-day activities. Id.

41

Id. (“Bennett’s activities increasingly raised his profile among East Coast philanthropists and the nonprofit
community, including the wealthy Templeton family.”); see also Wulf, supra note 21 (“Bennett became a popular and
influential figure in Philadelphia’s philanthropic and cultural circles”).
42

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9. Bennett actually won over John M. Templeton, Jr., a well-known
pediatric surgeon in Philadelphia. Id. Templeton is the son of the famous John Templeton, Sr. who was known as an
investor and philanthropist. Id. In addition to charming the younger Templeton, by 1990, Bennett had convinced the
elder Templeton of his endearing qualities, and Templeton, Sr. named Bennett a director of numerous mutual funds he
controlled. Id. The Templeton Institute is basically an extension of the Bell Institute’s Program for Nonprofit
Excellence. Id. Similarly to the Bell Institute, the Templeton Institute rewarded excellence in non-profit work. Id.
43

Id. This type of encouragement seems like a classic “help me help you” enticement style. Such reasoning was used
in the Blockbuster hit Jerry Maguire when Maguire (played by Tom Cruise) encourages Rod Tidwell (played by Cuba
Gooding, Jr.) to join Maguire’s newly independent agency. JERRY MAGUIRE (Sony Pictures 1996). This type of
reasoning also served as the name for an ABC sitcom series in fall 2006. Wikipedia, “Help Me Help You,” Mar. 21,
2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help_Me_Help_You (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). “Help Me Help You was a
comedy about a collection of eccentric individuals in group therapy with a respected therapist – who may quite
possibly have more problems than his patients.” Id.
44

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9. Regardless of which “good works” Bennett was conducting, each of
his endeavors fell under an “umbrella philosophy” that Bennett referred to as “Change the World for the Glory of
God.” United States v. Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d 513, 525 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“each organization he founded shared the
four elements of his “Change the World” philosophy: first, that God have a significant influence on the activity, which
defendant called a “Kingdom Focus”; second, that the activity “meet people’s needs”; third, that the activity be
directed to “eliminate pain and suffering”; and fourth, that the activity help “make others’ dreams come true.”).

8

Driven by his four-part philosophy, Bennett established the Foundation for New Era
Philanthropy (“New Era” or “Foundation”) in 1989 “to advise non-profits on management and
fundraising techniques.” 45 Because New Era initially followed through on the projected returns,
Bennett began to gain more acclaim among the charity circle and was even offered positions on
numerous boards. 46 However, the skeletons in Bennett’s closet from his Nova Institute days of
faulty accounting haunted his performance at New Era, and shortly after the Foundation began,
New Era faced financial difficulty. 47
II.

New Era’s Scam
The scam was simple. During its five and a half year operation, New Era managed to

swindle more than $135 million out of more than 1,100 charities and non-profit organizations until
the scheme collapsed and the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy filed for bankruptcy
protection. 48
1. The Check Kite 49
As previously mentioned, New Era was not Bennett’s first “business.” 50 In 1989, he was in
charge of “several businesses that were having financial difficulty.” 51 By late August, he began

Allen & Romney, supra note 2; see also Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (noting that the Foundation for
New Era Philanthropy is the successor company to Center for New Era Philanthropy). See generally Evelyn Brody, The
Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1491 (1998) (discussing New Era’s creation); Brief of RespondentAppellee at *7, United States v. Bennett, No. 97-1816 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1998) (“The heart of the scheme was Bennett’s
operation of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy [“New Era”]. Bennett began operating New Era as a
‘charitable organization’ in 1989.”).

45

46

Allen & Romney, supra note 2.

47

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (discussing Bennett’s circumstances leading to the check kite); see also
United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1998) (“In 1989, Bennett encountered financial difficulties in
connection with several of his businesses.”).
48

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

49

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “check-kiting” as: “The illegal practice of writing a check against a bank account
with insufficient funds to cover the check, in the hope that the funds from a previously deposited check will reach the
account before the bank debits the amount of the outstanding check.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 97 (2d pocket ed.
1996).
50

See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing Bennett’s financial difficulty with Nova Institute).

9

transferring money between his Philadelphia National Bank accounts and his Merrill Lynch
accounts. 52 Although he wrote checks from one account to deposit into another, these checks
were based on insufficient funds. 53 These “transfers” created false balances in Bennett’s accounts,
and by 1995, about 75% of the funds listed in Bennett’s Philadelphia National Bank and Merrill
Lynch accounts were fictitious. 54 “Suspicious transfers” can catch up to a person, and by August
31, 1989, Philadelphia National Bank placed a hold on one of Bennett’s accounts. 55
Bennett needed money, so he devised a plan and called it charity. 56 From September 5
through September 12, 1989, “Bennett contacted various individuals and asked them to participate
in a program which would allegedly allow them to increase their charitable giving.” 57 Donors
would deposit funds with New Era’s New Concepts Program, Bennett would control the money
for a period of three months, an “anonymous donor” would double the original amount, and
Bennett would send the doubled amount to a charity of the original donor’s choice. 58 Thus the

51

Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 45, at *8 (“Bennett encountered financial difficulties with several of his
businesses”).
52

Id.; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *7, United States v. Bennett, No. 97-1816 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1998) (“[I]n 1989 the
defendant engaged in a check kite.”); see also Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (“By September 1989,
Bennett had built up a fictitious $466,133 in PNB accounts and another $413,195 in Merrill Lynch accounts.”).
Bennett had four accounts with Philadelphia National Bank and two accounts with Merrill Lynch. Brief of Appellee,
supra note 45, at *8.

53 Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *8 (“For instance, on September 8, 1989, Bennett wrote checks totaling
$47,500.00 on one of his PNB accounts, which he deposited into one of his accounts at Merrill Lynch. The subject
PNB account had a balance of only $100 at the time the checks were written and deposited.”) (internal citations
omitted). See generally United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1998) (“As a consequence [of Bennett’s
financial difficulties], he devised a check-kiting scheme using his bank accounts at Philadelphia National Bank and
Merrill Lynch, writing checks from one account to another on insufficient funds and created false balances reflecting
fictitious amounts.”).
54 Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *8 (“Bennett’s passing checks between the PNB and Merrill Lynch accounts
created false balances in these accounts based on fictitious funds.”) (internal citations omitted).

Id. at *9; see also Carnes, supra note 9 (noting that “a PNB branch manager noticed a suspicious pattern of transfers
between Bennett’s PNB accounts and two Merrill Lynch accounts, and the bank froze Bennett’s New Era
Philanthropy account”).

55

56

See generally Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *8-9 (discussing the “big picture” of the New Era Ponzi scheme).

57

Id.

Id.; see also Bennett, 161 F.3d at 173 (“Bennett told potential investors that a wealthy donor would match their
contributions at the end of the holding period. The doubled funds would then be transferred to a charity of the
58
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“New Concepts in Philanthropy Fund” program began, and Bennett received approximately
$65,000 in initial investments. 59 Rather than investing the money as promised, Bennett used the
deposited funds to repay $800,00 in debt owed to Philadelphia National Bank and Merrill Lynch
from the check kite scam he designed to cover his indebted business accounts. 60
2. The New Concepts Program 61
The New Concepts in Philanthropy Program was the cornerstone of the Foundation for
New Era Philanthropy. 62 According to New Era’s bankruptcy trustee, Arlin Adams, this Program
attracted 99.4% of the funds deposited with New Era. 63 Here’s Bennett’s initial sales pitch:
An anonymous donor wants to encourage giving by offering to match
charitable gifts to various organizations. To participate, wealthy individuals
deposit their funds with New Era for a period of time. At the end of the
holding period, the gift will be matched by the anonymous donor and the
now doubled funds will be sent to the charity chosen by the original donor. 64
Initially, only individuals could participate in the program. 65 However, as time went on, Bennett
needed more money and became an equal opportunity scammer. The mandatory initial
contribution amount increased from $5,000 to $25,000, and the required waiting period grew from
donor’s choice.”); Carnes, supra note 9 (“Bennett, increasingly in desperate straits, . . . contact[ed] several friends to
participate at a minimum of $5,000 as ‘beneficiary donors’ with the pledge that their money would be doubled by an
anonymous donor after three months.”).
59

Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *9

Id. at *7-8. Bennett used the first wave of money to “pay down the overdrafts of his business accounts at Merrill
Lynch and the Philadelphia National Bank.” Bennett, 161 F.3d at 174 (noting that Bennett “routinely invaded the held
funds to benefit his for-profit businesses”).

60

61 In all, the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy had five programs: (1) the New Concepts in Philanthropy
Program, (2) the Templeton Institute for Non-profit Excellence, (3) the Bennett Fellows Program, (4) the Evelyn
Bennett Foundation, and (5) the Alan Ameche Foundation. Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *9. The Templeton
Institute for Non-Profit Excellence offered “training for religious non-profit organizations” in developing a board of
directors and improving both fundraising and management and was sponsored largely by the Templeton family. Id.
The Bennett Fellows program sponsored and trained youths in community service. Id. The Evelyn Bennett
Foundation, named for Bennett’s mother, provided needy individuals with financial assistance. Id. Finally, the Alan
Ameche Foundation assisted needy high school students in obtaining necessary tuition. Id.
62

Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *13.

63

Id.

64

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 173 n.1 (internal citations omitted).

65

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9; see also Bennett, 161 F.3d at 173 n.1 (describing Bennett’s sales pitch).
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three, to six, to nine, or even ten months. 66 By 1993, Bennett expanded the program to allow nonprofits to participate. 67 Eventually, Bennett sought donations from European and Asian
investors. 68 In the matching funds program, the anonymous donors were key, and over time
Bennett explained that the number of donors grew from one to nine over the five and a half year
operation. 69 As the number of investors increased, the scam grew into a pyramid scheme. 70
Bennett’s initial investors expected returns by January 1990.71 Luckily for Bennett, his for
profit consulting firm received a $250,000 payment from Bell Telephone around the same time. 72
This timely payment enabled Bennett to pay off his initial investors. 73 However, after this initial
set of payments, “Bennett would use no more real money for real services but would keep afloat
on the waves of money from the pyramid scheme.” 74

66

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *10; see Bennett, 161 F.3d at 174 (“Bennett expanded the program to allow
nonprofit organizations to participate.”).
67

68

Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *10.

69

Id.; see Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 174. See generally Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (discussing “The Pyramid
Crows”). As Carnes explains in his article, “[Bennett] used four basic methods: expanding the base of participation,
relaxing deposit restrictions, increasing the minimum contribution, and requiring a longer holding period in exchange
for a greater payout.” Id. Thus, once all factions were in place, Bennett created a pyramid scheme. Id.

70

Technically, pyramid and Ponzi schemes are not synonymous. See James Walsh, How Ponzi Schemes, Pyramid
Frauds Work, CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH MAGAZINE, June 1, 1999, at 10. The major difference is “in a Ponzi scheme,
money is handed over to be invested; in a pyramid scheme, money is handed over in exchange for a right to do
something (most often, to open a franchise or to solicit new members.” Id.
71

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

72

Id.

73

Id.

Id. As more individuals invested, Bennett used the new investments for two purposes: (1) to “prop up” his other
businesses and (2) to “match” previous donors’ funds thereby perpetuating the Ponzi. Brief of Appellee, supra note 45,
at *7-8 (“New Era was, from the outset, a Ponzi scheme, with the deposits of new money being used to match
(thereby doubling) the funds of the old depositors. Bennett, in fact, paid $3.5 million from New Era to companies
which he wholly owned and used another $3.4 million of New Era money to prop up his other failing businesses.”).
See generally In re M & L Business Machine Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1330, 1332 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1996) (defining “Ponzi scheme” as
“an investment scheme in which returns to investors are not financed through the success of the underlying business
venture, but are taken from principal sums of newly attracted investments. Typically, investors are promised large
returns for their investments. Initial investors are actually paid the promised returns, which attract additional
investors.”). As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, a Ponzi scheme is:
74
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Throughout the five and a half years, many investors conducted some form of due
diligence. 75 Bennett controlled these inquiries by only accepting new applicants who were
“nominated” by previous donors, thereby creating an exclusive “inner circle.” 76 Bennett provided
all investors with binders of information containing the details of the program. 77 These binders
explained that the anonymous donors signed trust agreements pledging to match the charitable
contributions, 78 Bennett received no salary, 79 New Era’s board of directors was comprised of
“prominent individuals,” 80 deposits were held in escrow or “quasi-escrow” accounts at Prudential
Securities in Kenosha, Wisconsin, 81 and New Era’s operating expenses were covered by the
interest earned on deposits during the mandatory holding period. 82
Bennett further corroborated his “binder of information” with false tax records filed with
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 83 In an effort to “further enhance the organization’s

A fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by later investors generates artificially
high dividends for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger investments. Money
from the new investors is used directly to repay or pay interest to earlier investors, usu. without any
operation or revenue-producing activity other than the continual raising of new funds. This scheme
takes its name from Charles Ponzi, who in the late 1920s was convicted for fraudulent schemes he
conducted in Boston.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2008).
Bennett, 161 F.3d at 175 (discussing Bennett’s response to due diligence inquiries); see, e.g., Susan Berger, This Charity
Scandal May Wind up Helping Donors Like You, MONEY, July 1995, at 24 (“W. Todd Bassett, divisional commander of the
Salvation Army in Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware, says the regional board acted with due diligence. He told
Money that although it initially rejected a request to invest in New Era, it approved the move after getting more
financial information.”).
75

See generally Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (“Particularly after October 1993, New Era required
lengthy application forms and a visit of the organization’s management to New Era headquarters.”).
76

77

Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *10.

78

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 175; Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *10-11.

79

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 175; Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11.

80

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 175; Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11.

81

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 175; Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11.

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 175; Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11; see also Brody, supra note 45, at 1491 (noting that
using the interest generated from the funds invested during the short-term period, New Era would “generate income
to defray operating expenses”).

82

83

See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing Bennett’s interactions with IRS actions).
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standing and credibility,” New Era applied for tax-exempt status in 1993. 84 However, the IRS
denied New Era’s request because the Foundation did not have a board of directors. 85 Not to be
discouraged, Bennett drew up a fictitious board of directors and re-submitted the paperwork. 86
Bennett’s resubmitted paperwork, however, remained incomplete; he omitted the “matching
funds” program because he was afraid that it would raise suspicions about the true nature of New
Era’s business. 87 “When an IRS auditor came to New Era’s premises in 1994, Bennett shielded the
official from the matching funds program and gleefully announced that New Era was so successful
that it had no liabilities. In 1993, an audit review of New Era’s books claimed only minor liabilities
and no obligations to repay funds.” 88
By lying to both accountants for New Era and an IRS auditor, Bennett convinced the IRS
to issue a “favorable audit letter” for New Era in 1994. 89 The falsified tax records showed that
New Era was “a stable organization.” 90 “The organizations and individuals relied on these

84

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

Id. The tax code provides that nonprofit organizations may file for tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006).
Further, the code also requires that to obtain nonprofit or tax-exempt status, an organization must have a board of
directors. See generally I.R.S. Pub. 557 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p557/ch03.html.
85

86

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9; Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11.

87

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

Id.; see Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11 (noting that New Era’s tax returns showed “virtually no liabilities” and
that no matching funds obligations were listed).

88

89 Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11-12 (“These documents did not show . . . liabilities because Bennett falsely
told accountants for New Era that there were the matching funds owed at the end of each year. Similar
representations were made to an auditor for the Internal Revenue Service.”) (internal citations omitted).
90

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.
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documents in their determinations to entrust New Era with their funds,” 91 and the funds available
to Bennett grew. 92
3. Bennett Strays from the Church
While Bennett became richer, he strayed from his church. 93 Rather than continuing the
weekly fellowships and prayer breakfasts, Bennett focused his attention on his for-profit business
ventures. 94 He increased his worldwide travel to such an extent that he became a “number one
customer” with his travel agency. 95 Perhaps because he spent so much money on travel, Bennett
even personally invested in the travel agency. 96 As one commentator noted:
It had become his practice to buy into companies doing business with his
organization. Bennett would funnel business into a firm, creating a measure of
dependence and indebtedness. Then he would buy into the firm to enhance his
authority and control. Once in place, this pattern became a trademark of his
operations. He later purchased interests in his accounting firm and Founder’s
Bank. 97
As he continued with his for-profit ventures, Bennett became blinded by the glitz and
glamour of increased wealth.
4. Bennett’s Expansion of Money Making Ideas

Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *11; see also Chernow Interview, supra note 3 (“One of the reasons that Mr.
Bennett was able to get away with this was that the organization was set up in 1989. He didn’t file any income taxes
until 1993. He had not registered with the State of Pennsylvania. If the organization had been fulfilling all of these
registration and tax requirements, the scam would have been exposed sooner, although, frankly, I was really quite
stunned in reading the audited statement of the organization, that these were people who had such a strong need and
desire to believe that they didn’t exercise even the minimal level of vigilance.”).
91

See generally United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Having satisfied investors and auditors that
New Era was a legitimate charity, Bennett then systematically transferred New Era funds to his struggling for-profit
businesses through loan and stock purchases.”).

92

93

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

94

Id.

Id. Bennett was partial to using Bala Cynwyd Travel Agency, Main Line Travel Service for his travel arrangements.
Id.

95

96

Id.

97

Id.
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As New Era continued to “prosper,” Bennett became more dependent on the inside
“finders” to attract additional capital. 98 These “finders” or “intermediaries” would typically recruit
new investors and nominate the organizations in exchange for a finder’s fee. 99 The finder’s fee was
typically a percentage of the doubled contribution to the finder’s choice charity. 100 “This technique
turned out to be a money machine for the intermediaries.” 101 However, when questioned, Bennett
vehemently denied knowledge of the finder’s fee arrangement. 102
In addition to utilizing finders to funnel money into his control, Bennett began transferring
money from the New Era accounts to Human Services accounts and Multi Media
Communications accounts. 103 Multi Media was a New York based publishing house that published
Christian oriented books. 104 Bennett simply financed the publishing house with $1.1 million of
New Era funds. 105 Although Bennett did not technically control Multi Media, he played an
important role in determining who was in charge of the publishing house. 106

98

Id. Bennett referred to the groups of smaller contributions as “bundles.” Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

Id. (“When questioned about the bundlers taking a percentage, Bennett has heatedly denied that he knew or
approved of this practice.”).

102

Id. Bennett also invested at least $817,000 from New Era into his Health Services company. Id.. Margaret Campolo
explained that “[Bennett] had such a neat idea in Human Services . . . . Businesses could subscribe, and if one of their
employees had a drug or alcohol problem, that person could go there and receive help without notifying the
company.” Id.

103

104

Id.

105

Id.

Id. Mutli Media was fairly small; the publishing house published “70 titles, including Billy Graham biographer
William Martin’s book My Prostate and Me, detailing [Billy Graham’s] own bout with prostate cancer.” Id. Bennett
originally tapped Jarrell McCracken, the founder of Word, Inc., as the president for the publishing house. Id.
However, because of McCracken’s suspicions of “wrongdoing in company ranks,” McCracken was terminated,
Richard W. Ohman took over the position, and Bennett became a “right-hand man” as the Multi Media Chair. Id.
These controlling antics illustrate Bennett’s Type-A management style. These controlling features early in Bennett’s
career foreshadow his management of New Era. In fact, the micro-management of New Era was one of the major
warning signs that New Era investors seemed to ignore.
106
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These various business ventures, at least around 1993, were paying off for Bennett. 107 In
turn, Bennett was generous with his “earnings.” 108 He “reward[ed] his associates and
intermediaries richly” and “finance[d] a posh lifestyle for his wife and their two daughters.” 109
Bennett liked to share in his “good fortune” so he brought friends into his ownership circle. He
gave Tony and Margaret Campolo, his previous weekly fellowship partner and his partner’s wife,
shares in Human Services. 110 Perhaps this generosity was easy for Bennett given that in 1993
alone, he controlled $41 million in cash. 111
5. Unraveling
When things sound too good to be true, they typically are. Any investment that guarantees
a 100% return within a short time period sounds too good to be true. As every finance student is
taught, without risk, there is no reward. Inversely, there is no reward without risk. Despite rare
and occasional “digging” throughout the five and a half years of the New Era scheme, few paid
attention the warning signs that were clearly in place.
a. Cash Shortages
One of the early warning signs that many New Era employees noticed was simply that
New Era seemed short on cash. 112 “New Era’s Mary Sinclair recalls the days when uncertainty and
doubt dampened staff enthusiasm. Cash shortages were often blamed on late payments from

107

See generally id. (noting that Bennett’s “operation” was “running full throttle”).

108

See generally id. (discussing Bennett’s rewards to his family and intermediaries).

Id. Given how much money Bennett siphoned from New Era investors, he upgraded his lifestyle. In fact, he lived
in a $620,000 home that he paid for in cash, drove a Lexus, and even splurged on baseball tickets. See Man Accused in
Charity Scheme Faces 82 Charges, supra note 33.

109

110

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

111

Id.

112

Id. (discussing the “suspicious signs”)
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clients, aggravated by Bennett’s policy of undercharging or sometimes even giving away
services.” 113
Tracy Ryan, Bennett’s chief assistant, remembers the sharp moments of anxiety early on in
her employment with New Era. The cash shortage even reached the point where Ryan
suspected the phone service would be cut off. Coworkers Jim Cummings and Bill
Bennington say paychecks dribbled in on erratic schedules. At times, the explanation was
that Bennett had simply forgotten to sign their checks. 114
This seemed problematic given that New Era was receiving numerous cash deposits. However,
these cash deposits were not being “matched” by anonymous donors and Bennett’s endless supply
of money dwindled.
b. Demands for Disclosures & Paperwork Persist
Throughout the process, Bennett discouraged employees, investors, and outsiders from
asking questions. 115 In the “binders of information” supplied to potential donors, the literature
warned organizations that if they asked questions that were not covered in the supplied binder,
they would not be entitled to participate in the matching funds program. 116 Bennett also instructed
Prudential employees to limit the information they gave to donors who called inquiring about their
“New Era” accounts. 117
As previously discussed, part of New Era’s early success was contingent on the fact that
Bennett did not tell the “whole truth” when registering New Era with the IRS. By 1993, outsiders
began to notice holes in the paperwork. 118 “In 1993, a whistleblower sent a letter to Mary Beth
Osborn, head of the Charitable Trust Section of the Pennsylvania attorney general’s office, lighting

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id. (discussing the “suspicious signs”).
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a fuse that would eventually blow Bennett off his pedestal.” 119 Even though the organization
started in 1989, New Era did not file tax returns or register as a charitable organization until
1993. 120
Based on an outside complaint, a few months after New Era obtained a loan from
Prudential in 1994, the IRS “sent an investigator to New Era’s premises for a field audit.” 121
“Bennett gave a federal agent fictitious minutes for December 1992 and December 1993 New Era
board meetings. Bennett had dictated them to his secretary only the day before.” 122 However,
given that Bennett continually fabricated records and lied to the federal investigator, New Era
“passed” the audit, and Bennett demanded a letter from the IRS reflecting New Era’s status. 123
“With that letter in hand, Bennett then triumphantly displayed New Era’s clean bill of financial
health to doubting donors and organizations.” 124
Coincidentally, New Era’s external auditor with the firm John P. McCarthy & Co., Andrew
Cunningham, began to ask questions concerning New Era’s accounting practices. 125 Around the
same time, Cunningham expressed to Bennett that he needed $50,000. 126 “In December 1994 and
January 1995, Bennett ‘swayed the loyalty of Cunningham,’ in the words of federal attorneys, with

119

Id.

Giles, supra note 20. Moreover, the organization failed to register with the State Bureau of Charities until 1993. Id.;
see also Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9. These greater financial disclosures were the “meat” that tipped
Albert Meyer off to New Era’s scam. Id. As discussed in Part III.a., infra, Albert Meyer is the Spring Arbor College
accounting professor who independently investigated New Era and altered authorities and the Wall Street Journal
about the Ponzi. Id.
120

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9. For a discussion of field audits, see Mervyn S. Gerson, et al., Dealing
with Tax Disputes, HAW. B. J. (July 1998).
121

122

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.; Man Accused in Charity Scheme Faces 82 Charges, supra note 20.

126

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.
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payments totaling $51,000.” 127 Bennett coupled the money with a suggestion to Cunningham to
stop asking questions. 128 These oversights by both Prudential and Cunningham led to lawsuits
against both parties. 129
c. Bennett’s Business Sense (or lack thereof) Begins to Show
By the mid-1990s, Bennett’s business ventures seemed reminiscent of the Nova Institute
project. 130 “By 1994, Multi Media publishing was in financial disarray. Bennett loaned additional
New Era moneys to Multi Media but moved administrative control to his own hands in Radnor.
Also, Bennett purchased about $1.8 million of Multi Media’s worthless stock, also using New Era
money.” 131
As New Era continued to fund Bennett’s other failing business ventures such as Multi
Media, the Foundation fell deeper and deeper into financial distress. 132 By 1994, the matching
funds program became problematic and Bennett needed new sources of money to pay the
donors. 133 By the summer, Bennett drew a $52 million loan from Prudential. 134 In addition to
paying off previous investors and financially supporting failing businesses, Bennett siphoned
money for himself and splurged on personal items, including a Lexus, baseball tickets, and a home
127

Id.; see United States v. Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d 513, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1998).

128

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

129

See infra Part III.b.5 (discussing the case against Prudential); Part III.b.6 (discussing the case against Cunningham).

See generally Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (noting that Bennett began to face financial distress in
1994).

130

131

Id.

132

See generally id. (“Pyramid schemes demand an ever-accelerating cash flow.”).

United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 175 (3d 1998) (“By 1994, Bennett could no longer cover the ‘doubled’ funds
solely through new donations.”); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *12 (“As in all Ponzi schemes, the need for
new funds to repay old debts became greater the longer New Era remained in operation. When in 1994, the need for
money to pay ‘doubled’ funds outstripped the infusion of new money, the defendant used a brokerage account at
Prudential Securities . . . to obtain sufficient funds.”) (internal citations omitted); Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison,
supra note 9 (noting that “Bennett needed to broaden the donor base quickly and delay payout so that he could keep
the operations afloat” and discussing New Era’s loan from Prudential “to keep the scheme afloat”).

133

United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that Bennett secured a loan from Prudential based
on treasury bills purchased with the depositors’ funds); Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9; see Allen &
Romney, supra note 2.

134
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for his daughter. 135 Bennett told individuals and charitable organizations that their money was
invested in treasury bills (“t-bills”) held in a Prudential account in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and donors
who invested more than $400,000 could double-check with Prudential that their funds were in
escrow. 136 Bennett warned Prudential employees to limit the information it dispensed and to tell
inquirers that money was in the escrow accounts when, in actuality, the t-bills simply served as
collateral for the loan. 137 This loan provided New Era with enough capital to double depositors’
funds until New Era filed for bankruptcy protection in fall 1995. 138
“In early 1995, Bennett and New Era reached their zenith. By the end of April, $122
million surged in, sweeping Bennett to a breathtaking crest before a gigantic plunge. He cultivated
some of America’s most wealthy family members, including Laurance Rockefeller, who agreed to
serve on New Era’s board.” 139 The huge influx of investments during the first half of 1995 made
Bennett desperate for additional income. 140 “Frantic for an ever-increasing flood of cash, Bennett
altered the previous pledge of doubling money in six months to two and a half times your money
in nine months.” 141
Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (“More than $354 million passed through New Era’s hands. Bennett
siphoned off at least $5 million for personal use and $3 million for support of his for-profit companies, court
documents reveal.”). By funneling contributions through his other companies, federal authority estimates indicate that
Bennett had ultimately transferred $3.5 million to himself. Allen & Romney, supra note 2.
135

“Special care was given to organizations and individuals that deposited more than $400,000. Bennett told these top
donors that they could call the Prudential Securities office in Kenosha, Wisconsin, provide the staff with a code
number, and the staff would inform the donor that a U.S. Treasury bill had been purchased on the donor’s behalf on a
particular date.” Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

136

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 175 (“Bennett told the organizations their money was being held in low-risk, interest-bearing
accounts and escrow or ‘quasi-escrow’ accounts ….”); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 52, at *10 (“Organizations
and individuals were told that their money was held in Treasury Bills at the Prudential Securities office in Kenosha,
Wisconsin, but were not told that the ‘quasi-escrow’ account[] . . . was really a margin account controlled by [Bennett]
that frequently had a large debit balance.”).
137

138

Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at *12; see infra Part III.b.2 (discussing the criminal case against Bennett).

139

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

Id. This is because Ponzi schemes need an ever increasing cash flow to survive so first wave investors can be paid
back with second wave investors’ contributions, then second wave investors can be paid back with third wave
investors’ contributions, etc.

140

141

Id.
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III.

The Downfall
a. Albert Meyer
Albert Meyer was to John G. Bennett, Jr. what U.S. Treasury agent Eliot Ness was to Al

Capone. 142 Though Bennett was by no means the head of an organized crime family, Bennett had
constructed a scheme and covered his “tracks” with faulty paperwork. Capone also covered his
tracks, but paperwork caught up to the notorious mafia boss. 143 Despite threats and constant fear
that he might be “offed,” Ness pursued his target and eventually gathered enough information to
charge Capone with tax evasion. 144 Though Meyer never feared for his life, Meyer, like Ness,
pursued his target despite warnings to stop meddling. Just as Ness brought down a Capone’s
crime family, Meyer brought down Bennett’s Ponzi.
Some may have thought of Albert Meyer as a hero; others thought of him as an
“alarmist.” 145 Originally from South Africa, Albert Meyer began working as an associate
accounting professor for Spring Arbor College in 1991. 146 “[H]e and his wife came in search of a

See Wikipedia, Al Capone, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Capone (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). Although Capone is
one of the most notorious gangsters in history, he was taken down for tax evasion. Id. He faced trial in 1931 on
twenty-two counts of tax evasion. Id. Though Capone was only found guilty on five of the counts, the federal judge
sentenced him to eleven years in prison. Id. Of those eleven years, Capone served six-and-a-half, before being released
for good behavior. Id.
142

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Giles, supra note 20.

Wulf, supra note 21 (noting that Meyer is from South Africa); Paul Demery, Accountant Blows Lid off New Era, THE
PRACTICAL ACCOUNTANT, 28 (July 1995) (noting that Meyer emigrated to America four years ago). While working as
a professor, Meyer tried to instill ethics in his students. Albert Meyer, Taking a Stand, ACCOUNTANCY SA, Sept. 1,
2002, at 6, available at 2002 WL NR 5507374. In fact, he often gave students examples of what could go wrong if the
accountants failed to serve the public rather than the individual whims of a client. Id. As Meyer explained in his
article:
146

To illustrate my point, I used the following example. This was before the Enron debacle that for years
to come will be held up as the poster child of audit failure. It's about Jose Gomez who had a bright
future with Grant and Company, the tenth largest CPA firm in America at the time. Gomez was
promoted to managing partner of the firm's Florida office while he was still in his early thirties.
Unfortunately, he never realized [sic] his potential. Not many years after making managing partner,
Gomez began serving a twelve-year term in a federal prison in Tallahassee, Florida, after pleading
guilty to forgery and fraud. The story is too long and complicated to relay here, but suffice to say that
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new cultural experience apart from the hectic pace of major U.S. cities.” 147 Though he found a job
in the small town of Arbor, Michigan, Meyer was by no means secure in his position. 148 He came
to the United States on a three-year working visa. 149 Because Spring Arbor was such a small
institution, Meyer also kept the University’s books. 150 When Meyer noticed “a $296,000
disbursement . . . to the Heritage of Values Foundation” he became skeptical. 151 He did not trust
the name because “it reminded him of a similarly named theme park tied to a corrupt TV
evangelist.” 152
Based on his gut instincts, Meyer began to investigate the company. 153 First, Meyer looked
through the University’s books. 154 Noting that the Heritage of Values Foundation was not
included on the list of endowments, he began to ask questions. 155 Meyer explained, “I’m an
accountant, I have to ask questions.” 156 University officials explained that the Heritage of Values
Foundation was actually a part of New Era, but these explanations did little to quell Meyer’s
apprehensions. 157 Further digging revealed that New Era was not actually registered as a
Gomez succumbed to a series of ploys initiated by one of his audit clients, some very subtle
psychological deceptions that spun a web of deceit out of which he could not extricate himself.
Id.
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Demery, supra note 146.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. This is likely a reference to Jim Bakker’s PTL scandal in the early 1990s. For more of a discussion about Jim
Bakker, see supra note 9.
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Wulf, supra note 21.
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Id. In fact, Albert Meyer took this very seriously. In his articled entitled, Taking a Stand, Meyer approvingly quoted
a 1932 Fortune magazine article that stated, “Today it is no overstatement to say that there are three professions upon
whose ethics, as well as upon whose skill, modern society depends: law, medicine, and Certified Public Accounting
….” Meyer, supra note 146.
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foundation. 158 Armed with his suspicions, Meyer requested New Era’s return records from the
IRS office in Philadelphia. 159
Meyer voiced his concerns to the school’s administration, but the administration was
disinclined to listen to his warnings. 160 In fact, in an interview subsequent to New Era’s downfall,
Meyer stated, “I was told it’s tough raising funds, and they didn’t need my meddling.”161 Despite
warnings from the school’s administrators to stop digging, Meyer persisted on his quest to discover
the underlying truth. 162 Meyer contacted Bennett directly. 163 Rather than being duped by a silvertongued salesman, Meyer described Bennett as “bewildered and flustered” when asked about New
Era’s accounting practices. 164
Following Meyer’s conversation with Bennett, Bennett warned Spring Arbor to silence
Meyer. 165 In fact, the President of Spring Arbor, Dr. Allen Carden, stated, “I know Albert Meyer,
and his intentions are good. But I have communicated to Mr. Bennett that Albert’s actions should
in no way be interpreted as coming from Spring Arbor College.” 166 For a short time these threats
silenced Meyer, but once he secured a tenured position, he revamped his investigation of New
Era. 167
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Wulf, supra note 21.
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Id. (quoting Albert Meyer); see also Giles, supra note 20 (“When Meyer voiced his concerns … ‘They said, “You’re
biting the hand that feeds us….”).
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See generally Wulf, supra note 21 (discussing the break-down of the New Era Ponzi scheme).
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Id. (quoting Meyer as saying “‘[h]e wasn’t a smooth talker. There was an ‘aw, shucks’ atmosphere to it all. At the
end of our conversation, when I put down the phone, I actually liked the guy”).
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By spring of 1995, coincidentally at the height of New Era’s investments, Meyer began a
“full-scale investigation” of New Era’s finances and structure. 168 Meyer began by reviewing New
Era’s falsified 1993 tax returns. 169 “A careful look made it clear that New Era’s numbers just didn’t
add up. [Meyer explained,] ‘It treated what I thought were investments as gifts to New Era, so
they were shown as revenues and he showed no liabilities. . .’.” 170 Meyer noted that New Era
reported no “anonymous donor” contributions and showed a mere $34,000 in earnings interest. 171
In fact, “‘[i]f New Era was holding up to $10 million at any time, it should have run up $600,000 to
$1 million in interest income,’ Meyer said. ‘But [Bennett] was not holding the money to earn
interest. He had to pay it out because he was robbing Peter to pay Paul.” 172 Armed with the
falsified tax returns and desperate for someone to listen to his concerns, Meyer wrote letters to:
(1) the IRS, (2) the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), (3) the U.S. Attorney General’s
office, and (4) the Wall Street Journal. 173 These letters played an integral role in bringing down the
five and a half year Ponzi scheme. 174
b. SEC Investigation

168 Id.; see also Paul M. Clikeman, Commentary of Arthur Andersen and Dan Rather, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Oct. 11, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 11559169 (“Accounting professor Albert J. Meyer, working alone on nights and weekends,
exposed a $200 million investment scam at the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy.”).
169

Allen & Romney, supra note 2.
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Demery, supra note 146.
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Allen & Romney, supra note 2.

172 Demery, supra note 146; see also Allen & Romney, supra note 2 (“According to Meyer’s calculations, the deposited
funds should have generated as much as $1 million in interest.”).

Allen & Romney, supra note 2; Wulf, supra note 21. Because of his bravery and diligence in pursuing the New Era
pyramid scheme, Meyer received a job offer from Martin Capital Management, an Indiana based investment firm.
Meyer, supra note 146. While employed at Martin, Bennett’s watchdog tendencies continued, and he began
investigating Coca-Cola Company’s accounting practices. Wulf, supra. “Meyer claim[ed] that Coke is artificially
boosting its results through transactions with a partly owned affiliate.” Id. This position was not long-lived because
Meyer “questioned” one of Martin’s major clients. His investigation led Martin to fire Meyer. Id. Shortly after
Meyer’s dismissal from Martin, Meyer took a position working for Mr. Tice, who employs eleven financial analysts
who publish newsletters containing recommendations for buying and selling stock. Id.
173
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Wulf, supra note 21.
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Based on Meyer’s letter, the SEC began to investigate New Era. 175 Upon its lead, the SEC
promptly notified Prudential of the investigation. 176 At the time of notification, Prudential held a
New Era account with a balance of $73 million. 177 As an article in Time magazine noted, “When
Prudential examined the account, it came across one troubling aspect: those funds were used as
collateral for a $52 million loan.” 178 Next, “Prudential conducted a routine look at a New Era
account in Kenosha, Wisconsin that held about $60 million in T-bills. The firm became alarmed
when it discovered New Era had borrowed $52 million on margin and had repaid only $7.1
million.” 179 Prudential asked New Era for company records, New Era’s attorneys refused, Bennett
failed to account for $44.9 million outstanding, and Prudential called the loan. 180 “On Friday, May
12, Prudential Securities liquidated $44.9 million of T-bills in New Era’s account.” 181 As Bennett’s
carefully constructed house of cards began to fall, the SEC charged Bennett with diverting “$4.2
million into two firms he controlled personally.” 182
c. The Final Countdown
Perhaps it was the earlier phone call from Meyer or maybe it was Wall Street Journal writer
Steve Stecklow’s investigatory journalism; but whatever the reason, by early May 1995, Bennett
realized that New Era faced impending collapse. 183 On May 13, 1995, Bennett tearfully addressed
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Id.
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Allen & Romney, supra note 2.

Id.; Wulf, supra note 21; see also “Voices’ Defense Denied in Fund Raising Fraud Case,” FUND RAISING MANAGEMENT,
May 1997, at 28. (“Bennett’s grand scheme came to a collapse in May, 1995 when New Era failed to pay a creditor and
was revealed as a paper enterprise with over $135 million in debts and no assets or income.”).
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his New Era employees, confessing, “I have betrayed you.” 184 Shortly thereafter, Bennett wrote a
letter to his contributors that stated: “Those of you who know us, know we would never have
done anything other than enable you to grow and flourish. My sole desire is to do everything
possible to see that the obligations we have to you are fulfilled.” 185
Although authorities exposing crimes may have been one problem Mr. Bennett faced, the
Wall Street Journal exposure may have been even more problematic. When Stecklow contacted
Bennett, Bennett knew that the New Era scandal would be publicly exposed. 186 On May 15, 1995,
the Wall Street Journal cover story subtitle glared “Some Say Matching Grants by New Era
Foundation Resemble Ponzi Scheme.” 187 By May 16, 1995, New Era’s luck had significantly
changed. 188 Stecklow published a follow-up article entitled “Crumbling Pyramid: Owing $500
Million, New Era Charity Seeks Refuge from Creditors: Mystery Donors Don’t Exist, Founder
Tells His Staff; Colleges Face Big Losses – A Hard Blow to Good Works.” 189
On the same day as publication of the first Wall Street Journal article, May 15, 1995, New
Era filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 190 In its petition, New Era cited $551 million in
liabilities and a mere $80 million in assets. 191 When asked about his scheme, Bennett explained,
“As the years passed by, the desire became a dream, the dream became a need, the need became an
184

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9.

Wulf, supra note 21; Judge Orders Bankrupt Charity to Liquidate and Pay Creditors, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, available at
GALE Document No. A155432674 (“‘To have cause doubts, concern and pain to any of you is most distressing to
me, to say the least,’ [Bennett] said.”).

185
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Allen & Romney, supra note 2.

Steve Stecklow, A Big Charity Faces Tough New Questions about Its Financing, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1996, at A1, available
at 1995 WL-WSJ 8711270. See generally Brody, supra note 45, at 1491 (discussing the effect of the Wall Street Journal
article on New Era’s downfall).
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See Brody, supra note 45, at 1492 (discussing the Wall Street Journal’s follow up article).

Steve Stecklow, Crumbling Pyramid: Owing $500 Million, New Era Charity Seeks Refuge from Creditors, WALL ST. J., May
16, 1995, at A1, available at 1995 WL-WSJ 8711671. See generally Brody, supra note 45, at 1492 (discussing the article).
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Id. The New Era attorneys “explained that the total liabilities of $551 million reflected the matching promises
related to . . . outstanding funds [or those funds that had not yet been repaid].” Id.
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obsession, the obsession became a fantasy, and the fantasy became a delusion.” 192 Soon after New
Era filed for bankruptcy, Bennett was indicted for fraud, the SEC “accused New Era of selling
unregistered securities and Bennett of diverting at least $4.2 million from New Era donors to
companies under his control,” and Prudential faced a class action lawsuit. 193
IV.

Aftermath
a. Economic Aftermath
The losses resulting from New Era’s scheme were catastrophic. Some Christian investors

and charities lost faith in philanthropy. 194 Numerous institutions lost significant amounts of
money. 195 Some organizations nearly collapsed. 196 Affecting more than 1,100 charities and nonprofit organizations, New Era defrauded donors of more than $135 million. 197
b. Court Proceedings
Despite the enormous hardships and economic difficulties caused by New Era’s Ponzi
scheme, John G. Bennett, Jr. went through the court proceedings fairly peacefully. Even though

192

See, e.g., Tony Carnes, Bennett ‘Dream’ Became ‘Delusion,’ CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 27, 1997.
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Giles, supra note 20 (noting the SEC’s charge against Bennett); Wulf, supra note __ (same).

Carnes, “Bennett ‘Dream’ Became ‘Delusion,’” supra note 192 (“Bruce Johnson of Leighton Ford Ministries wrote that
donor loss of trust and increased skepticism has been ‘tremendous.’”); David Neff, How Shall We Then Give? Lessons
from the New Era Debacle, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 17, 1995 at 39 (“The net result has been an enormous loss of
confidence.”).
194

See, e.g., Neff, supra note 194 (“[M]any … were tricked by the promise of quick infusions of capital. Some
[organizations] even took out loans in order to deposit money with New Era. One institution, incredibly, ‘bet the
farm,’ placing its entire endowment in New Era’s hands.”).
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See, e.g., Randy Frame, New Era Settlement Seeks $85 Million in Repayments, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 8, 1996, at 42
(“[A]t least one ministry is on the brink of collapse because of New Era. Chapel Ministries, based in Carol Stream,
Illinois, has sold its two office buildings and laid off eight of its forty workers to stay afloat. Chapel Ministries ended
fiscal 1995 with a $700,000 loss.”); Prudential Settles New Era Suit; Investors Eye Larger Payback, CHRISTIANITY TODAY,
Jan. 6, 1997, at 68 (“some organizations hurt by New Era are teetering on the edge of financial ruin”); Frame, The ‘PostNew Era’ Era, supra note 24 (noting following New Era’s collapse, the Chapel of Air Ministries “teetered on the brink
of extinction”); Matt Miller, Less than Nonprofit, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 30, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 2353664
(describing that the Chapel of the Air Ministries, Inc. heavily invested in New Era and thought about filing Chapter 7
after the debacle).
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Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9; see also Bennett, 9 F. Supp. at 519 (noting that the loss was calculated
to be in excess of $100 million based on the undisputed evidence as to the amount owed investors when New Era
collapsed).
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the New Era Ponzi collapsed in 1995, New Era lived on in the courts for a few more years.
Numerous cases sprung from the scheme, including: (1) In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 198
(2) United States v. Bennett, 199 (3) SEC v. Bennett, 200 (4) Museum of Jewish History v. Bennett, 201 (5) Messiah
College v. Prudential, 202 and (6) United States v. Cunningham. 203 Although other suits tangentially related
to New Era may have arisen, this paper discusses only the cases listed above that are directly
related to New Era’s collapse.
1. In re Foundation for New Era
New Era originally filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on May 15, 1995. 204
Although Bennett initially hoped to reorganize New Era, when he realized that he no longer had
the support of any charities, he voluntarily converted New Era’s petition to a Chapter 7 filing on
May 19, 1995, and the court appointed John T. Carroll III as interim trustee. 205 In its original
petition, New Era listed a mere $80 million in assets as compared to $551 million in liabilities. 206
Through the incredible work of bankruptcy trustees John Carroll and Arlin Adams, much of the
paid out funds were recovered and the overall loss was calculated as $135 million. 207
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See infra Part IV.b.1.
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202

See infra Part IV.b.5.
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See infra Part IV.b.6.
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Judge Orders Bankrupt Charity to Liquidate and Pay Creditors, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, available at GALE Document
No. A155432674 (discussing Bennett’s decision to change New Era’s petition from a Chapter 11 filing to a Chapter 7
filing); Foundation for New Era Philanthropy Announces Filing for Voluntary Protection under Chapter 11, P.R. NEWSWIRE, May
15, 1995, available at LEXIS (noting that New Era intended to file under Chapter 11).
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Karen W. Arenson, Charity Group Charged in Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1995, available at GALE Document No.
A155427141. For a general discussion about the differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy, see Ned
W. Waxman & W. Homer Drake, Jr., The New Practice under the Amended Bankruptcy Code, 71 A.B.A.J. 55 (Feb. 1985).
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See Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra note 9 (“The federal bankruptcy court has recovered more than 60
percent of the lost $135 million and through negotiation and lawsuits is attempting to recover as much as 90 percent of
the money. Bennett’s assets of $958,000 have also been used to reduce the losses.”).
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From the outset, the trustees sought reimbursement of monies actually paid to New Era
donors. 208 Many charities voluntarily complied. 209 As Al Ciardi, a partner in the same law firm as
Carroll, noted, “the charities feel morally directed to give back their ill-gotten gains.” 210 In addition
to attempting to make the losers “whole,” the trustees sought to minimize litigation costs by
encouraging settlement. 211 The trustees reasoned that this method would help minimize the
overall loss.
Immediately upon appointment, Carroll began his investigation as to New Era’s assets and
liabilities. 212 He enlisted the help not only of his law firm, Ciardi, Maschmeyer & Karalis, but also
of Miller, Tate & Co., a forensic accounting firm. 213 With the help of both of these firms and
information supplied from organizations involved, Carroll filed a Statement of Financial Affairs
and Bankruptcy Schedules with the court on June 16, 1995. 214 However, Carroll’s service as trustee
was short-lived. 215 “[Carroll] unified creditors against him when he notified them that he would
oppose all their proofs of claim and notices of claim, evidently seeking to disqualify all or most

New Era Philanthropy Bankruptcy Trustee Seeks Voluntary Return of Funds, FINANCIAL NEWS, May 24, 1995, available at
LEXIS (noting that Carroll initially requested that organizations voluntarily return funds).

208
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See generally id.
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Id.

Id. (“Carroll said the ultimate intention is to recover the funds, while heading off any threat of litigation until the
charitable organizations have a chance to meet.”).
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New Era Trustee Files Statement of Financial Affairs and Bankruptcy Schedules; Filing Reflects Revised Numbers Based on ‘Net’
Calculations, P.R. NEWSWIRE, June 16, 1995 available at LEXIS.
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Id. “Forensic accounting is the practice of utilizing accounting, auditing, and investigative skills to assist in legal
matters.” Forensic Accounting Information, http://www.forensic-accounting-information.com/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2008).
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New Era Trustee Files Statement of Financial Affairs and Bankruptcy Schedules; Filing Reflects Revised Numbers Based on ‘Net’
Calculations, supra note 212 (noting that “Carroll sent a letter to the more than 300 listed creditors seeking their
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214
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creditors from voting on a permanent trustee.” 216 The creditors then selected former Third Circuit
Judge Arlin Adams to serve as trustee. 217 As the organizations involved began to understand the
breadth of the situation, many banded together to make the best of a bad situation.
a. United Response
Given the sheer number and the philanthropic undertones of investors, many came
together following New Era’s bankruptcy announcement. 218 Many formed the group United
Response “to share legal and financial resources and expertise to assist member organizations.” 219
Created by the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (“ECFA”), 220 United Response
encouraged those who benefited from the scam to remit their earnings to the trustee to reimburse
the “losers.” 221 Playing to the morals of the charitable organization “winners,” ECFA President
Paul D. Nelson stated, “‘We’ve appealed to these groups to step forward voluntarily in a fashion
that is biblically and morally correct [to understand] that the money they received did not come
from anonymous donors, but from a sister charity.’” 222 A combined effort of the organizations
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Id.
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Id.
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See Giles, supra note 20 (discussing the creation of United Response).

Id.; see also Prudential Settles New Era Suit; Investors Eye Larger Payback, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 6, 1997, at 68
(noting that United Response “attempted to address the crisis equitably and without expensive litigation”).
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Randy Frame, New Era Bankruptcy Case Moves Toward Resolution, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 16, 1996, at 82; see also
Berger, supra note 75, at 24 (describing ECFA as “a group of 800 Christian nonprofits”). See generally Frame, The ‘PostNew Era’ Era: Ministries Band Together to Overcome Losses, supra note 24 (describing United Response as “an effort
coordinated by the [ECFA] to make the best out of the nightmarish circumstances resulting from the collapse of the
Pennsylvania-based Foundation for New Era Philanthropy”).
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Maxwell, supra note 46. The number of participants in United Response changed over time. Compare Frame, The
‘Post-New Era’ Era: Ministries Band Together to Overcome Losses, supra note 24 (noting 153 member organizations as of July
17, 1995) with Frame, New Era Settlement Seeks $85 Million in Repayments, supra note 196 (noting that United Response
had 185 organizations as of Apr. 8); and Maxwell, supra note 46 (noting that United Response had 177 organizational
members); and Settlement Reached in New Era Case, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 16, 1996, at 959 available at GALE
Document No. A18792649 (noting that United Response had 195 members as of October 1996).
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Frame, New Era Settlement Seeks $85 Million in Repayments, supra note 196 (“Nelson’s appeal is based on the Golden
Rule: ‘We’re asking organizations to treat others as they would like to be treated.’ He adds that even if no definite
plan is in place, ‘we want organizations to step out in leadership and do the right thing.’”).
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involved and Trustee Adams, United Response provided a cost effective alternative to litigation
and encouraged “winners” to remit their “ill-gotten gains.” 223
In addition to asking net profiting companies to remit their “winnings,” the trustee sought
to settle with all parties involved. 224 The proposed settlement agreement took a largely economic
approach to recovering funds paid to donors but also played to the philanthropic undertones. 225
The agreement called for Bennett to “turn over his $620,000 house, car, stock holdings, retirement
savings and other assets as well as the house of one of his daughters.” 226 The plan “require[d] the
support of organizations representing at least 80 percent of the money lost to New Era. It also
call[ed] for the endorsement of donors representing at least 80 percent of the amount given to
New Era with the misguided expectation that their gifts would be doubled by the wealthy, and
apparently nonexistent, anonymous donors.” 227 The proposed plan required those organizations
that benefited from the scheme to return the proceeds within two months for distribution to those

223

Id. (“One of its goals is to achieve fair redistribution through negotiation, not through legal action.”).
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Id.

See Frame, New Era Bankruptcy Case Moves Toward Resolution, supra note 220 (discussing the “Acts of Faith”). Many
praised the “‘fair’, ‘creative,’ and ‘landmark’” agreement Adams proposed to collect money that New Era paid to the
“winners” of the Ponzi. Id. However, others criticized the seemingly cold approach given the Christian and
philanthropic nature of the participants. See id. “‘United Response has taken a primarily economic approach to this
case, and has neglected the opportunity for blessing involved by encouraging the open hand of stewardship and the
sacrificial return of inappropriately gained profits.’” Id. (quoting Paul D. Nelson, President of the Evangelical Council
for Financial Accountability); see also Settlement Reached in New Era Case, supra note 221 (quoting the Honorable Rollin A.
Van Broekhoven, describing the settlement agreement as “a magnificent legal document, [that] also is driven by moral
and religious motivation”).
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Frame, New Era Bankruptcy Case Moves Toward Resolution, supra note 220. An investigation into Bennett’s and New
Era’s finances showed that Bennett used New Era funds to purchase a home for his daughter. Id.
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Id.
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who lost money in the scheme. 228 At the time proposed, remission of funds would return an
immediate $39 million to the bankruptcy estate for redistribution. 229
Nearly ninety percent of both donors and organizations supported the plan. 230 Some
organizations readily returned their net profits. 231 However, asking those who made money to
voluntarily give it up proved difficult for United Response. 232 Mercy Ships, an organization that
“promote[s] health and well-being by serving the urgent surgical needs of the forgotten poor and
empowering developing communities” netted $3.5 million from New Era, and rather than initially
giving up its profits, the ministry let the situation play out. 233 Those organizations that did not
deposit with New Era and were given unsolicited money were also hesitant to return it or faced
financial stress if they chose to return the gifts. 234 Accordingly, most of the “winners” chose to
“wait and see” what ground rules were established before voluntarily returning money to the
estate. 235

Id. Although the plan seemingly called for return of all “net positive” payments, the agreement was not worded as
such. Id. “The agreement encourages ‘net positive’ organizations to give back the full 100 percent. But it requires
payment of just 65 percent, and less than that in cases of financial hardship. Thus, in theory, the plan allows for some
organizations, in the end, to gain from New Era 35 percent or more of what they put in, while others stand to lose 35
percent.” Id.
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Id.

Id. (“While most of the more than 180 evangelical schools and Christian organizations [were] solidly behind the
United Response, support [was] not unanimous.”).
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See, e.g., Frame, New Era Settlement Seeks $85 Million in Repayments, supra note 196 (“Baptists for Life is among a
handful of organizations that have voluntarily relinquished New Era profits to the bankruptcy trustee.”).
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See generally id. (“Many organizations profiting from New Era spent the money and are unable or unwilling to pay it
back. Some organizations have contended that they accepted money from New Era in good faith and feel under no
obligation to return it.”).
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Mercy Ships, http://www.mercyships.org/site/c.ehKHI0PJIqE/b.2733647/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); see Maxwell,
supra note 46 (discussing Mercy Ships’ hesitance to voluntarily remit funds to New Era prior to a final settlement).
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See Frame, The ‘Post-New Era’ Era: Ministries Band Together to Overcome Losses, supra note 24 (“The Arlington, Virginia
based Enterprise Development International, for example, invested no money with New Era but received – and spent
– more than $156,000 in unsolicited grants. President Robert Hancock says that the organization is committed ‘on
moral and biblical grounds’ to repay the grants, ‘even though it puts our organization in jeopardy.’”).
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Frame, New Era Settlement Seeks $85 Million in Repayments, supra note 196 (“[T]he majority of ‘net positive’
organizations are playing the waiting game. Wanting to make sure they are not the only ones to return the money. . .
.”).
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The proposed plan also called for Prudential to return the money it received as repayment
of its loan to the estate. 236 Prudential opposed the plan, and the trustee filed suit against the
securities firm for “giving credibility to New Era despite evidence of problems.” 237 The following
subsection discusses the proceeding that arose when Prudential sought indemnification for the
trustee’s claims against it.
b. In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy v. Prudential
Securities, Inc., et al., 201 B.R. 382 (B.R. E.D. Pa. 1996).
“On June 26, 1996, the chapter 7 trustee, Arlin M. Adams, filed an adversary proceeding
against defendant Prudential Securities, Inc.” 238 In his 34-count complaint, the trustee alleged that
Prudential received and benefited from numerous “fraudulent conveyances” as defined by 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 239 The complaint also alleged that Prudential “knew, or should have known, or

See generally In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy v. Prudential Securities, Inc., et al., 201 B.R. 382 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (proceeding concerning Prudential’s opposition to the trustee’s proposed plan); Part IV.b.1.b. (discussing the
same).
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Frame, New Era Bankruptcy Case Moves Toward Resolution, supra note 220.
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 384.
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Id. This provision states:
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider
under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including
any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if
the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)
(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
(ii)
(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction,
for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured ; or

34

had a reasonable basis to suspect that the debtor was operating a pyramid scheme and
misrepresenting the nature of its commercial relationship with [New Era] to third parties.” 240 The
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the
benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2005).
For a recent case involving the fraudulent conveyance provision during a Ponzi scheme case, see Bayou
Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re Bayou Group, LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 630 (Bankr. D.N.Y.
2007). The Bayou Superfund case states:
This provision, like analogous provisions under state law, avoids the entire amount of "any transfer"
which was made by the transferor with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. Moreover,
the entirety of the transfer is avoidable whether or not the debtor received value in exchange, and the
plaintiff need not allege and prove that the transfer was for less than fair value if actual intent is
alleged and proved under Section 548(a)(1)(A). See Sharp Int'l Corp. v. State Street Bank and Trust
Co. (In re Sharp Int'l Corp.), 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. McCombs, 30
F.3d 310, 328 (2d Cir. 1994)) ("[W]here actual intent to defraud creditors is proven, the conveyance
will be set aside regardless of the adequacy of consideration given.") (applying the actual fraudulent
conveyance provision of the DCL); see also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1995), reh'g
en banc denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17088 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. African Enterprise, Inc.
v. Scholes, 516 U.S. 1028 (1995) (under analogous Illinois fraudulent conveyance statute, "if
fraudulent intent is proved, then . . . the defendant, unless he had no knowledge of the transferor's
fraudulent intent must return the entire payment that he received rather than just the amount by
which it exceeded the consideration that he gave in exchange for the payment"); Hayes v. Palm
Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Research and Tech. Group, Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 538 (9th Cir. 1990)
(under Section 548(a)(1)(A), "the entire transfer may be avoided, even if reasonably equivalent value
was given, so long as the transferor actually intended to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors and the
transferee accepted the transfer without good faith"); Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner), 335 B.R. 140,
145 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005), modified on reconsideration by, 345 B.R. 674 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006)
("the entire transfer is avoided" under Section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code); 5 Collier on
Bankruptcy P 548.01 [1] at 548-11 (15th ed. 2006) ("[I]f the transaction is fraudulent within the rules
set forth in section 548, the trustee may avoid it in its entirety without any limitation on the extent of
the recovery other than those imposed by § 548(c) to protect transferees and obligees in good faith."
(footnote omitted)).
In re Bayou Group, LLC, 362 B.R. at 630.
For an in-depth analysis of the fraudulent conveyance provision in light of a Ponzi scheme, see Mark A.
McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998). Mr.
McDermott concludes:
In sum, courts recently have established that if a trustee proves the existence of a Ponzi scheme and
that a particular person actually invested in the scheme and received payments from the debtor as a
result of those investments, then the trustee is entitled to key presumptions in his favor in any
fraudulent or preferential transfer action against the investor. Both the debtor's actual intent to
defraud as well as its insolvency normally will be presumed. The investor will not be able to keep any
fictitious profits which he received and will be unable to assert the ordinary course defense in any
preference action. Perhaps most importantly, the investor will have to pay to the estate any amounts
representing a return of his principal investments in any action for intentional fraud if he fails to carry
the burden of proving that he received the transfers in objective good faith.
Id. at 186-87.
240

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 384.
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trustee asserted that because Prudential gained “excessive profits” in its participation of the Ponzi,
Prudential should return the money it received from the contracts and forego any litigation rights it
may have had for the pre-petition loan. 241 In addition, the trustee asserted that any claim
Prudential may have against New Era be subordinated to claims of other creditors, given
Prudential’s participation in the scheme. 242
In response, Prudential asserted that it did not and should not have known about New
Era’s Ponzi scheme. 243 Prudential explained that it merely made loans to New Era, New Era
secured the loans, the loans were repaid in full, and others actually benefited from the scam. 244
Because Prudential asserted that the loans were properly repaid, Prudential filed third-party
complaints against Bennett and New Era claiming indemnification. 245 Prudential also asserted a
third-party claim for indemnification against thirty-nine entities that received proceeds from
Prudential as a result of New Era’s scam. 246 Prudential argued that requiring it to pay rather than

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id.

Id. (“PSI alleges that this third-party defendant [Bennett] made misrepresentations and false statements to PSI’s
employees in order to hide his operation of a pyramid scheme. PSI contends that, to the extent the trustee succeeds in
recovering the payment of loan proceeds made to PSI, PSI relied upon these material misrepresentations made by Mr.
Bennett to its detriment.”).

245

Id. Interestingly, forty parties were listed on the complaint rather than thirty-nine. Id. Bankruptcy Judge Bruce Fox
pointed this discrepancy out in his opinion, but chose to refer to the thirty-nine entities because Prudential had done
so in its pleadings. Id. These entities include: Dartmouth College, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania,
Amelior Charitable Fund, Balch Institute, Brandywine YMCA, Chattanooga Christian School, Citivision, Conservative
Baptist Foreign Mission Society (CB International), Detroit Institute of Arts, English Language Institute of China,
Ephrata Community Hospital Foundation, Focus, Frankford Hospital, Freedom Baptists Schools, Fuller Foundation,
Gordon College, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, Heal the World Foundation, J.S. Herr Foundation, Jesus
Film Project, The Johnson Foundation, Kim College, Laity Lodge Foundation, Lan-Chester Christian School,
Lancaster Christian School, Leadership Network, Maranantha Endowment Fund, The Mariposa Foundation, National
Constitution Center, National Coalition Against Pornography, P.R.O. Missions, Peace Valley Church, Pennsylvania
Academy of Fine Arts, Presbyterian Children’s Village, Sim, U.S.A., Spring Arbor College, and United World Mission.
Id. at 382.
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the entities who received payment would provide those entities with unjust enrichment. 247
Accordingly, Prudential sought indemnification. 248 Prudential filed both of these third-party
complaints in the bankruptcy court asserting that the court had jurisdiction because (1) the claim
“relate[d] to” the original bankruptcy case and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1367 granted supplemental
jurisdiction. 249
The trustee filed a motion to strike Prudential’s third-party complaints asserting that the
claims violated Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7014, or in the alternative, that the third-party actions should be
severed from New Era’s bankruptcy proceeding. 250 Prior to discussing the trustee’s motion to
sever the complaints, Judge Fox addressed sua sponte whether the bankruptcy court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the third-party complaints. 251 As such, he first addressed jurisdiction as a
related proceeding and then addressed possible supplemental jurisdiction. 252
1. “Related” Proceedings
Judge Fox explained that three categories of proceedings arise in the bankruptcy context:
(1) core bankruptcy proceedings, (2) non-core related proceedings, and (3) non-core unrelated
proceedings. 253 The bankruptcy court may both hear and resolve core proceedings. 254 As for
Id. “Unjust enrichment is defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. Unjust
enrichment describes a recovery for the value of the benefit retained when there is no contractual relationship, but
when, on the grounds of fairness and justice, the law compels the performance of a legal and moral duty to pay.” 66
AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 9 (2007).
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248

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 384

249

Id.

Id. at 385. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7014 simply incorporates Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 into bankruptcy proceedings. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7014. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 governs third-party practice and when a party may bring supplemental claims
against a third-party defendant. FED. R. CIV. P. 14.

250

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 385 (noting that if the court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims, then the trustee’s motion to sever the third-party complaints would be moot).

251

252

Id.

253

Id.

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)). This provision states: “Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under
title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11 . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2008).
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non-core related proceedings, the bankruptcy court “may hear and submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions to the district court.” 255 The bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to
hear non-core unrelated proceedings. 256 Thus, the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction may extend to a
non-core proceeding that is “related to” the original bankruptcy case, but no further. 257 A
supplemental case is “related to” the original proceeding when “the outcome of [the supplemental]
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . . An action is
related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom
of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and
administration of the bankrupt estate.” 258
Nearly all of the parties involved agreed that the proceedings were non-core, but
disagreements arose regarding whether they were “related” proceedings. 259 “[T]he outer boundary

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 385 (citing U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)). This provision states: “A
bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title
11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy
judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely
and specifically objected.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2008).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 385 (citing In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 85 Bankr. 956, 969
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Bowling Green Truss, Inc., 53 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. W. D. Ky. 1985)) (emphasis in
original).

256

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 384 (“[t]he outermost parameter of bankruptcy jurisdiction is
defined by the concept of a related or non-core proceeding”).

257

258

Id. at 386 (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 734 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 386. The court noted that whether the proceedings were
characterized as “core” or “related to” had little effect on the court’s ability to hear the case. Id. The only major
difference in the two classifications is that the court lack’s the power to enter final judgment without the parties
consent in a “related to” proceeding. Id.; see also Matter of Walker v. Cradle Co., 51 F.3d 562, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon the bankruptcy court); Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th
Cir. 1987) (same).

259

Obviously, Prudential and the trustee disagreed as to whether the third-party complaints were related
proceedings. Most of the named parties played passive roles in this proceeding, but Presbyterian Children’s Village
took the position that the third-party complaint proceedings were core proceedings. In re Foundation for New Era
Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 387. Presbyterian Children’s Village argued that Prudential simply tried to get around the
Bankruptcy Code’s transfer avoidance provision. Id. For an extensive discussion on the avoidance provision, see
Veryl Victoria Miles, A Debtor’s Right to Avoid Liens against Exempt Property under Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code:
Meaningless or Meaningful?, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 117 (1991). Presbyterian Children’s Village argued that allowing
Prudential to collect from the third-party defendants on a state law claim of indemnification would violate the
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of bankruptcy court jurisdiction is defined by those disputes whose outcomes ‘could conceivably
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.’” 260 Thus, if the outcome could
not affect the bankruptcy proceeding, it is not within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. 261
Oftentimes, issues that arise between creditors may affect the bankruptcy proceeding. 262
The effect of creditors’ proceedings often differs based on what type of bankruptcy the debtor
filed. 263 For example, the identification of a creditor will have little effect on a chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding because all of the debtor’s assets are being liquidated. 264 Typically, when a
creditor and a debtor are involved in a subsequent proceeding, the dispute will usually fall within
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because it directly conflicted with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In re
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 387.
Judge Fox found Presbyterian Children’s Village’s reasoning “unpersuasive” because core proceedings invoke
a substantive right that must be decided by a bankruptcy court. Id. Prudential’s indemnification claims were deeply
rooted in state law remedies and were not bankruptcy issues. Id. As such, the indemnification proceedings could not
be “core” bankruptcy proceedings. Id. Judge Fox also noted that Presbyterian Children’s Village’s reasoning was
faulty because it “implie[d] that a proceeding may be classified as core even if its outcome would have no conceivable
effect upon the administration of a bankruptcy case.” Id.
In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 387 (citing In re Guild and Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171,
1181 (3d Cir. 1996); Matter of Lemco Gypsun, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990)).

260

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 389 (citing see, e.g., Pettibone Corp. v. Easley, 935 F.2d 120 (7th
Cir. 1991) (request by the chapter 11 debtor to enjoin a tort suit against it after confirmation was outside bankruptcy
jurisdiction as such relief was not necessary for the consummation of the plan); In re Haws, 158 Bankr. 965, 971
(Bankr. S.D.Tex. 1993) (despite section 541 of the Code, an adversary proceeding brought by the chapter 11 trustee
postconfirmation was dismissed as outside bankruptcy jurisdiction because any damages the trustee would recover
would not be distributed to creditors under the terms of the confirmed plan); In re Greenley Energy Holdings of
Pennsylvania, Inc., 110 Bankr. 173, 184 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1990) (Scholl, B.J.) (adversary proceeding seeking an
interpretation of a confirmed chapter 11 plan was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction, even though 11 U.S.C. § 1142
grants the bankruptcy court power over disputes regarding the implementation of a confirmed plan, because its
outcome would not affect the debtor's reorganization); In re Malone, 74 Bankr. 315 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1987),
recommendation approved, C.A. No. 86-361 (E.D.Pa., Sept. 30, 1987) (Fullam, D.J.) (proof of claim litigation could
not be resolved by the bankruptcy court because it would have no conceivable effect upon the estate)).

261

262

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 390.

Id.; see, e.g., In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 85 Bankr. 956, 969 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). See generally Matter of Xonics,
Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1987). “Other times, the outcome of the dispute will affect only the rights of the creditors
inter se without making any difference in the bankruptcy case itself.” In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R.
at 390; (citing see, e.g., Matter of Walker, 51 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1988);
Matter of Kubly, 818 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Pettibone Corp., 135 Bankr. 847 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1992); In re
Haug, 19 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. D.Or. 1982)).

263

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 390 (“For instance, the relative priority of liens may be of
significance in a chapter 7 case where the collateral is being liquidated. However, if the collateral were not to be
administered by the chapter 7 trustee (usually because there is no equity in the property), then the relative position of
the lien creditors may make no difference to the administration of that bankruptcy case. The priority question will
matter greatly to the creditors upon foreclosure, but that dispute can and must be resolved in a non-bankruptcy forum
when it arises.”).
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the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction because the outcome of the subsequent proceeding may either
increase or decrease the size of the debtor’s estate. 265 However, third-party claims that do not
involve the debtor or the trustee likely will not affect the bankruptcy proceeding. 266 When neither
the estate nor the original proceedings will be affected, then “‘judicial economy alone cannot justify
a court’s finding jurisdiction over an otherwise unrelated suit.’” 267
The trustee’s claim against Prudential related to the original bankruptcy proceeding because
prevailing on its claim against Prudential could increase the size of the debtor’s estate. 268 On the
other hand, Prudential simply sought indemnity from the third-party defendants if the trustee
prevailed. 269 Prudential’s claims against the third-party defendants would not affect on the size of
the estate 270 because Prudential simply sought indemnification from the third-party defendants if it
was held liable. 271 Indemnification claims typically fall outside of the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction. 272 In this case, Prudential did not claim that the effect of the third-party claim will

Id. (“Third-party complaints which involve the debtor or bankruptcy trustee, either as a third-party plaintiff or
third-party defendant, will often have an effect upon the administration of a bankruptcy case because the outcome
could affect the size of the estate (if the trustee succeeds as a third-party plaintiff) or could affect the amount of claims
asserted against the estate (if the trustee does not prevail as a third-party defendant).”).

265

266

Id.; (citing see, e.g., Matter of Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 753 (5th Cir. 1995); accord Matter of Walker, 51 F.3d at 569).

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 390 (quoting Matter of Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 753-54 (5th Cir.
1995)).

267

268

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 391.

269

Id.

Id. (“PSI’s success or failure as third-party plaintiff will not enhance the funds in the bankruptcy estate available for
distribution by the chapter 7 trustee.”).

270

Id. (“Indemnification differs from contribution. As explained by the Third Circuit: ‘Indemnification and
contribution differ in the extent to which a tortfeasor is able to rid himself of liability. Where the entire liability shifts,
indemnification is invoked; on the other hand, where liability is shifted only proportionately, contribution exists
instead.’”) (quoting De Laval Turbine, Inc. v. West Indiana Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 259, 271 n.17 (3d Cir. 1974)).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 384 (citing E.g. Matter of Walker; Matter of Schwamb, 169
Bankr. 601, 604 (E.D. La. 1994), affirmed without op., 48 F.3d 530 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Delta Airlines, Inc. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 515 U.S 1131 (1995); In re Spaulding & Co., 131 Bankr. 84, 88 (N.D. Ill.
1990); In re Remington Development Group, Inc., 180 Bankr. 365 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1995); In re Summitt Airlines, Inc.;
In re Pettibone Corp., 135 Bankr. at 850 ("Bankruptcy Judges frequently lack 'related to' jurisdiction to hear third-party
complaints which arise from Adversary proceedings"); In re K & R Mining, Inc., 135 Bankr. 269 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1991) (holding that there was no bankruptcy subject matter jurisdiction over a cross-claim); In re Blava In-Line, Inc.,
133 Bankr. 33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re German, 97 Bankr. 373, 375 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Kaiser Steel
272
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change the size of the bankruptcy estate, but rather that Prudential’s claim would affect the
administration of the case because it affects the number of claims against the estate. 273
Prudential based its position on the notion that the third-party claims were related to the
proceedings because they may affect the administration of the case was based upon § 502(h) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 274 Prudential alleged that the trustee sought to “avoid various transfers of loan
Corp., 95 Bankr. 782, 791 (Bankr. D.Colo.), aff'd on other gnds, 109 Bankr. 968 (D.Colo. 1989); In re Maislin Industries,
U.S., Inc., 75 Bankr. 170, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re John Peterson Motors, Inc., 56 Bankr. 588, 591 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1986); see also In re Fietz, 852 F.2d at 458; In re Houghton, 164 Bankr. 146 (Bankr. W.D.Wash. 1994).
Compare In re Leco Enterprises, Inc., 144 Bankr. 244, 247, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (third-party complaint was related
because the bankruptcy estate would, by agreement, recover a percentage of all sums recovered by the third-party
plaintiff)).
In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 392. See generally In re Salem Mills, Inc., 148 Bankr. 505 (Bankr.
N.D.Ill. 1992) (holding that a third-party claim was related to a bankruptcy case because its outcome would increase
the amount of claims asserted against the estate).

273

274

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 392-93.

Section 502(h) provides:
(h) A claim arising from the recovery of property under section 522, 550, or 553 of this title [11 USCS
§ 522, 550, or 553] shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen
before the date of the filing of the petition.
(i) A claim that does not arise until after the commencement of the case for a tax entitled to
priority under section 507(a)(8) of this title [11 USCS § 507(a)(8)] shall be determined, and
shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under
subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of
the filing of the petition.
(j) A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. A
reconsidered claim may be allowed or disallowed according to the equities of the case.
Reconsideration of a claim under this subsection does not affect the validity of any payment
or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an allowed claim on account of such allowed
claim that is not reconsidered, but if a reconsidered claim is allowed and is of the same class
as such holder's claim, such holder may not receive any additional payment or transfer from
the estate on account of such holder's allowed claim until the holder of such reconsidered
and allowed claim receives payment on account of such claim proportionate in value to that
already received by such other holder. This subsection does not alter or modify the trustee's
right to recover from a creditor any excess payment or transfer made to such creditor.
11 U.S.C.S. § 502(h) (2005). Typically, a Chapter 13 debtor is allowed to discharge obligations upon payment
of the same if the debtor “(1) certifies . . . that all domestic support obligations that came due prior to making
such certification have been paid; (2) has not received a discharge in a prior case filed within a certain time
frame . . . ;” and (3) “has completed an approved course in financial management. . . .” Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Basics, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter13.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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payments made by the debtor to [Prudential].” 275 “[I]f the trustee were to recover avoidable
transfers from [Prudential], the trustee [would] also seek to preclude [Prudential] from asserting
any claims against the estate or to subordinate those allowable claims.” 276
Prudential based its indemnification claims on a theory of unjust enrichment. 277 Prudential
argued that the thirty-nine entities would be unjustly enriched if Prudential were forced to pay. 278
“If [Prudential] is denied any allowable claims against the estate, or if such claims are subordinated,
that result would only occur if the trustee were to prove misconduct by [Prudential] that rises to
the level of ‘very substantial’ misconduct involving ‘moral turpitude or some breach of duty or
some misrepresentation whereby other creditors were deceived to their damage’ or as gross
misconduct amounting to fraud, overreaching or spoliation.’” 279 Thus, both of Prudential’s
arguments were based on Prudential being found liable. 280
Regardless of the subrogation, the amount of a claim on behalf of the estate would remain
the same. 281 The amount of the trustee’s claim would remain the same whether Prudential paid,

Section 502(h) simply describes certain discharges that may be disallowed. Id. Several other cases address the
fraudulent conveyance provision within a similar factual setting involving a Ponzi scheme. See, e.g., In re M&L
Business Machine Co., Inc., 160 B.R. 851 (1993); In re International Loan Netork, 160 B.R. 1 (1993); In re
Mark Benskin & Co., Inc., 161 B.R. 644 (1993); In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1991); In re
Independent Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843 (1987).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 392.

276

Id.

277

Id.

278

Id.

Id. (quoting In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 161 Bankr. 107, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (quoting In re Osborne, 42 Bankr.
988, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1984))).
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280

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 394.

281

Id. at 395.
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Bennett paid, or one of the thirty-nine entities paid. 282 As such, the identity of the liable party was
irrelevant because it would not affect the administration of a chapter 7 proceeding. 283
Although Prudential argued that the identification of the party would affect the proceeding
of the case and was thus “related to” the original case, Prudential mistakenly relied upon chapter
11 precedent rather than chapter 7 precedent. 284 Chapter 11 cases involve placing creditors into
appropriate classes, some of which have more power in approving the reorganization plan than
others. 285 Chapter 7 cases, on the other hand, do not have creditor classifications or voting by
creditors. 286 Thus, even though a creditor’s identity may matter in chapter 11 cases, that is not the
case in chapter 7 liquidation cases. 287 Because Prudential’s identification as a potential creditor is
irrelevant, the third-party claims were not “related to” the original bankruptcy filing for
jurisdictional purposes. 288
2. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Next, Judge Fox addressed whether supplemental jurisdiction existed over Prudential’s
third-party claims. 289 Supplemental jurisdiction exists over a claim if the subsequent claim is so
related to the original case that it is part of the “same case or controversy.” 290 Although
bankruptcy courts are split regarding whether bankruptcy courts may exercise supplemental

282

Id.

Id. (“The only difference will be in the identity of the claimant, but the identity of the claimant is immaterial in a
chapter 7 liquidation case such as this one.”).

283

284

Id.

Id. at 396. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2005) (noting the classifications of claims); 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (noting the
procedure to be followed in accepting a reorganization plan).
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286

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 396.

287

Id. at 397.

Id. (“Therefore, I conclude that the third-party complaints are not ‘related to’ the chapter 7 bankruptcy case of this
debtor, in that their outcome will not affect the administration of the case in any manner.”).

288

289

Id. at 397-99.

290

Id. at 397 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
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jurisdiction over a claim, Judge Fox explained that the statute does not give the bankruptcy court
the power to hear unrelated cases. 291 He asserted that the statutory provision grants only the
district courts the power of supplemental jurisdiction and such jurisdiction “should be recognized
as but one of a number of statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction issued by Congress to the
district courts.” 292 In fact, bankruptcy courts are specifically limited to core and related
proceedings. 293 “If a proceeding is unrelated to the bankruptcy case, the district court has no
authority to refer it to a bankruptcy judge – even if the proceeding falls within some other federal
jurisdictional grant.” 294
3. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Lastly, Judge Fox explained that ancillary jurisdiction did not extend to Prudential’s thirdparty claims. 295 Ancillary jurisdiction exists when a district court exercises jurisdiction over a state
law claim. 296 This jurisdiction disappears as soon as the original case is removed or finished. 297
The bankruptcy court can only exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a supplemental claim if the case
was filed when the original lawsuit commenced. 298 Because Prudential’s claim was filed subsequent

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 397; see In re South Bay Medical Associates, 184 Bankr. 963
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); In re W.J. Services, Inc., 139 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992); In re Eads, 135 Bankr. 387
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991); see also In re Feifer Industries, 141 Bankr. 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (declines to exercise
supplementary jurisdiction).

291

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 397 (“Other [grants of jurisdiction] include diversity jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1332, admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, patent jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1338, postal matter
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1339, and, of course, bankruptcy jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1334.”).
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293

Id. at 398 (discussing the limits imposed on bankruptcy courts by 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 398
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See id.

296

Id.

Id. at 399. See generally Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354 (1996) (noting that “a federal court may exercise
ancillary jurisdiction ‘(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,
factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate
its authority, and effectuate its decrees.’” (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379-380,
(1994))).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 399. See generally, e.g., Felice v. Sever, 985 F.2d 1221, 1225 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993); Rheuport v. Ferguson, 819 F.2d 1459, 1467 n.13 (8th Cir. 1987).
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to New Era’s original petition, no ancillary or supplemental jurisdiction existed over Prudential’s
claim. 299
4. Summary
Because the third-party claims were not filed at the commencement of the suit, the parties’
identity would not affect the administration of the estate, and were not related to the New Era’s
original bankruptcy filing, Judge Fox ruled that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over
Prudential’s third-party claims against Bennett, New Era, and the thirty-nine entities. 300 As a result,
subject matter jurisdiction did not exist in this case, the court did not need to discuss the merits of
the trustee’s motion to sever the claims, and the court dismissed Prudential’s claim. 301
c. In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS
1891 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 22, 1996).
After the court ruled against Prudential’s initial objection to proposed settlement plans, the
trustees pushed forward with settlement agreements with the involved entities.302 In mid-July
1996, Trustee Adams sought approval of three settlement agreements in relation to New Era’s
bankruptcy proceedings. 303 Adams’ proposed settlement agreement involved claims against
Harvard University, Princeton University and the University of Pennsylvania. 304 Additionally,
Adams sought approval of an agreement in relation to claims against New Era’s estate by
“Laurence S. Rockefeller, Frank E. Richardson, III, The Richardson Foundation, William Thatcher
Longstreth, John H.T. Wilson, James J. O’Neill, Henry F. Harris, Vivian Piasecki, The Ross Family
299

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. at 399.

300

Id.

301

Id.

See generally In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891, *1 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1996)
(discussing certain settlement agreements); In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. October 24, 1996) (same); In re Foundation for New Era, Nos. 95-13729 and 95-0237 (Bankr. Ct.
E.D. Pa.) (containing the final settlement agreements).

302

303

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891, at *1.

304

Id.
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Fund, the Benfamil Charitable Trust, George Bennett, Frank Richardson and the Whitehead
Foundation.” 305 Objectors to the proposed settlement agreements argued that they did not have
enough information to determine whether the settlement agreements were fair to all parties
involved. 306
As previously mentioned, the trustee sought to recover monies paid out to “net positive”
organizations in New Era’s pyramid scheme. 307 However, many of the organizations involved
could not return a full 100% of the funds received. Accordingly, the trustee took an opportunity to
settle with certain entities for less than a 100% return. 308 In the proposed settlement agreement,
Harvard was to return $502,500 to the estate, which would be a 93% return of its net positive
obligation. 309 Princeton University was to pay $2,106,972.95, which would equal a 91.3% return of
its net positive obligation. 310 Similarly, the University of Pennsylvania was supposed to repay
92.4% of its net positive obligation, equaling between $2,418,867.50 and $2,618,867.50. 311 The
settlement agreements with each of the Universities included a “most favored nation” type

305

Id. at *1-2.

Id. at *2. The “objectors” included Rescue Mission Alliance of Syracuse, Wesley Skinner, and Sacred Works, Inc.
Id. Although these objectors were represented by a law firm, John Carroll, former Trustee was admitted to represent
these entities pro hac vice. Id.

306

307“[T]he

concept of a ‘net positive obligation’ is defined in these circumstances as the amount paid to the universities
less the amount donated to the debtor on their behalf less funds deposited by them and still held by the debtor. While
the settlement implicitly permits these three universities to retain the amount paid to them to the extent of donations
made on their behalf, the settlement also requires that those who made the donations withdraw their claims against the
estate.” In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891, at *10.
Id. at *7 (“[I]f the trustee proposed to settle for less than 100% of the listed net positive obligation, he was still
obligated to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a).).
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Id. at *8.
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Id.
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provision that enabled the Universities to reopen settlement negotiations if the trustee settled more
favorably with similarly situated entities. 312
The trustee stated four reasons for settling for less than a 100% return: (1) uncertainty of
the outcome if litigation ensued; (2) the costs of litigation might be greater than the costs forgone
by the settlement agreement; (3) settlement reaps immediate payment; and (4) the settlement
agreements could be a “springboard” to convince other entitles to settle. 313 As such, Trustee
Adams explained that these “discounts” would cause greater overall benefit for the estate. 314
In his professional capacity, a trustee is “a fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate, i.e., its
creditors.” 315 “When a bankruptcy trustee seeks to compromise a dispute, he must seek court
approval on notice and hearing.” 316 A bankruptcy court must review the trustee’s actions to ensure
that the trustee acts in accordance with the fiduciary duties owed to the creditors. 317 Although
trustees may act within the ordinary course of their duties without much oversight from the court,
when a trustee begins to act “outside the ordinary course, the usual articulated standard for review
is the business judgment standard.” 318 Bankruptcy courts have interpreted the business judgment

Id. at *8-9 (“Those similarly situated parties – of which there are eleven – include the Dartmouth College Alumni
Fund, Cornell University, and the University of Virginia. The trustee explained that all three of these universities
insisted upon this provision so as not to be penalized for being among the first to reach an accord with the trustee.”).

312

313

Id. at *11-12.

Id. at *11-13 (noting that “the trustee testified that these three proposed agreements would enable him to reach
similar accord with most if not all of the net positive obligors and thereby be in a position to distribute funds sooner to
the creditors in this case, many of whom are charitable entities”).

314

315

Id. at *15.

Id. at *14; see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) (“Compromise. On motion by the trustee and after a hearing on notice to
creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to such other
entities as the court may designate, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891, at *15-16 (citing In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co.,
925 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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Id. at *16 (citing Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 523
(1943); In re Titusville Country Club, 128 B.R. 396 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991)).
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rule to mean that the trustee must obtain “reasonable terms” in a settlement agreement, and the
trustee must be given a certain degree of discretion. 319
In addition to the court’s approval of the trustee’s actions, some of the creditors must also
approve the settlement agreements. 320 Although support of settlement agreements need not be
unanimous by all creditors, a certain contingency must be “on board.” 321 In this situation, the
court noted that Trustee Adams was acting with a contingency support when he sought approval
of the settlement agreements. 322 This is an important aspect in enforcing “approved” settlement
agreements.
Similarly to valuing the assets of an estate, when a trustee seeks approval of a settlement
agreement, the trustee must seek a fair and reasonable value for compromising litigation. 323 The
value of litigation has three “components” that must be taken into consideration: (1) “the amount
likely to be awarded by final judgment;” (2) “the cost of obtaining that award;” and (3) “the
portion of the award that may be collected on the execution.” 324 “The actual recovery, less costs, is
the value of the litigation.” 325 Litigation, unlike cash, is a very difficult asset for a court to value. 326
As such, the most common method of valuation is for the trustee to offer a range of likely
recovery coupled with the likely costs of litigation in comparison with the proposed settlement. 327
319

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891 at *16, *20.
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Id. at *21.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *22; see also In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891 at *22-23.
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Id. at *23.

Id. at *24 (“Of all types of assets, litigation is among the most difficult for a bankruptcy court to value.”). Id. at *23
n. 14 (“In considering the appropriateness of a trustee sale of an asset, the Third Circuit has noted: ‘Traditionally,
courts have held that “fair and valuable consideration is given in a bankruptcy sale when the purchaser pays 75% of
the appraised value of the assets.”’” In re Abbotts Diaries of Pennsylvania, Inc., 788 F.2d at 143 (quoting In re Rock
Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d 1195, 1197 n.1 (7th Cir. 1978))).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891 at *24-25.
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In regards to the proposed settlement agreements, the objectors raised three main
concerns; they argued that: (1) the trustee failed to demonstrate that the estate was not entitled to
a 100% return; (2) the trustee was entitled to a greater than 100% recovery in litigation; and (3) the
“most favored nation” provision would force the trustee to “rebate” portions of the settlement at a
later time. 328 Despite the objectors’ concerns, Judge Fox found their objections unpersuasive for
three main reasons, which are discussed below. 329
First, Judge Fox noted that the objectors’ reliance on the “law of the case” was ill-placed. 330
The objectors explained that the order should be vacated because they received insufficient
information to determine whether the trustee’s valuation was “fair.” 331 The objectors sought relief
from an order under the provisions of the bankruptcy code. 332 However, the Mar. 26, 1996 order
had already been entered and the appeals period had passed. 333 Further, because the trustee did
not settle for amounts outside of the scheduled amount, the judge determined that the proposed
settlement agreements were fair and the objectors’ concerns were misplaced. 334
Secondly, the objectors’ asserted that Trustee Adams fell short of his business judgment
rule duty. 335 “The objectors posit that the trustee’s claims are virtually assured, the universities are
financially able to pay any judgment and the costs of litigation far less than the trustee’s estimate of
10% of the claim.” 336 However, the objectors fail to take into account the costs of litigation. 337
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Id. at *25-26.

329

Id. (“I find all three objections unpersuasive”).
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Id.
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Id. at *29.
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Id.
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Id. at *28.

334

Id.
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Id. at *34.
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Id.
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Id.
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The costs of litigation can be extensive, and by settling, the parties could avoid paying attorneys
fees and avoid the chance of losing any claim to the money. As such, the trustee reasoned, and the
judge agreed, that settling rather than litigating could save the estate significant amounts of
money. 338
Finally, in response to the objectors’ most favored nation provision concerns, Judge Fox
explained that the provisions applied only to settlement agreements worked out by the trustee
rather than any litigation that might ensue. 339 As such, the entities agreeing to settle as the initial
parties approving settlement simply did not want to be penalized by agreeing to settle earlier than
other similarly situated entities. 340 The objectors argued that because litigation might result in a
lower than 100% or 92% return of net proceeds from the “winners,” the size of the estate may
later be adversely be affected by defenses that other universities or donors may have. 341 “[S]o long
as the trustee does not consent to more favorable terms [in other settlement agreements], the
outcome of litigation will not require the trustee to rebate any settlement funds to these three
universities.” 342 Thus, the most favored nation provision would only extend to those situations in
which the trustee sought settlement from similarly situated parties.
In sum, Judge Fox concluded that “the inclusion of a conditional rebate provision in these
settlement agreements does not yield the result that the trustee is settling for a sum less than is
reasonable under these circumstances. The condition which would trigger such a rebate seems to
be very unlikely to arise, as it would require the trustee’s acquiescence, something his counsel has

338

Id.
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Id. at *43.
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Id.

341

Id.

342

Id. at *44.
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promised would not occur.” 343 Ultimately, Judge Fox approved the proposed settlement
agreements citing two main reasons: (1) the settlement agreements quickly resolved some debtors’
claims, and (2) approving settlement agreements at an early stage may encourage other parties to
follow suit. 344
d. In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS
1893 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. October 24, 1996).
Perhaps “encouraged” by the previously approved settlement agreements, shortly after
Judge Fox approved the Universities’ agreements, Trustee Adams sought approval of two new
settlement agreements with the Nature Conservancy and One to One Partnership, Inc.. 345
Similarly to the previous hearing before the bankruptcy court, Prudential objected to the proposed
settlements. 346
Based on the complexity of the New Era estate and the sheer number of contingent claims,
Judge Fox began his opinion with an introductory lesson of the terms used to define creditors and
debtors in New Era’s bankruptcy proceeding. 347 Although three groups existed – depositors,
beneficiaries, and grantees – these groups were divided into two subgroups – the “positives” who
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Id.

344

Id. at *46.

345

See generally In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. October 24, 1996).
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Id.
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Id. at *4-5. Some of these definitions included the following:
A "beneficiary" is an entity which was "a designee of a donor;" a "donor" is an entity "that sent money
to the Debtor with the expectation that the donated money would be matched by the Debtor" and
the donation and matched sums would be paid to a beneficiary. "Matching funds" refer to the amount
the debtor promised to pay to a beneficiary or a depositor in addition to the donation or deposit, and
which was generally equal to the amount received by the debtor from a donor or depositor. A
"depositor" is an entity which invested funds with the debtor in the expectation of receiving back its
deposit plus matching funds.

Id. These definitions are used throughout this Part.
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had a repayment obligation and the “negatives” who had claims against the estate. 348 Many of the
entities that had claims against the estate had not only “negative pecuniary claims” for the amount
deposited and lost, but also “nonpecuniary claims” for the amount New Era promised to the
debtor but failed to pay. 349
a. The Nature Conservancy’s Proposed Settlement
Agreement
As a “positive” in the Ponzi, the Nature Conservancy netted $568,000.00 from New Era. 350
$284,000.00 represented the “return of principle,” whereas $284,000.00 represented the “matched
funds.” 351 Subsequent to receiving the matched funds, the Nature Conservancy deposited an
additional $2,000,000.00 in New Era. 352 This amount was neither doubled nor repaid. 353 The
Nature Conservancy’s funds were placed into numerous New Era related accounts, and at least
one account holding $1,025,458.66 was not commingled with other depositors’ money, but was
segregated in its own account. 354
The Nature Conservancy and Trustee Adams disagreed regarding the amount the donor
was entitled to recover. 355 The Nature Conservancy argued that it was entitled to receive
$2,000,000.00 as a pecuniary claim, and could reserve the nonpecuniary claim of $2,000,000.00 for
New Era’s failure to pay the promised funds, whereas Trustee Adams asserted that the Nature
Conservancy was entitled to a pecuniary claim of $1,716,000.00 which represented the
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Id. at *5-6.
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Id. at *6-7.
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Id. at *7.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *8.
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$2,000,000.00 deposit less the original repayment of $284,000.00. 356 The Nature Conservancy
further argued that Trustee Adams wrongfully took control of the Nature Conservancy’s
segregated account as part of the bankruptcy estate because the account should be “subject to an
‘express, resulting and/or constructive trust.’” 357
Despite the disagreements, Trustee Adams proposed a settlement agreement by which
“[t]he trustee will receive 25% of the funds in the segregated accounts (approximately $276,400.00)
while the Nature Conservancy will receive the remaining 75% (roughly $830,000).” 358 The
proposed agreement also provided that the Nature Conservancy would hold a right to a general
unsecured claim against the estate for $977,500.00, as well as an identical subordinated claim. 359
b. One to One Partnerships, Inc.’s Proposed Settlement
Agreement
Similarly to the Nature Conservancy, One to One also received matched funds from the
early days of New Era’s scam. 360 One to One received a total of $5,970,494.25 from New Era,
$3412,994.25 of which were matched funds and $2,557,500.00 from principal payments. 361 After
its initial receipt of matched funds, One to One invested an additional $4,490,000.00 that was

356

Id.

Id. An “express trust,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary is “the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the
beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title; a property interest held by one person
(the trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third-party (the beneficiary). For a trust to be valid, it
must involve specific property, reflect the settlor’s intent, and be created for a lawful purpose.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 723 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). An “express trust” is “a trust created with the settlor’s express intent, usu.
declared in writing; an ordinary trust as opposed to a resulting trust or a constructive trust.” Id. at 724. A “resulting
trust” is “[a] trust imposed by law when property is transferred under circumstances suggesting that the transferor did
not intend for the transferee to have the beneficial interest in the property.” Id. at 725. A “constructive trust,” on the
other hand, is “[a] trust imposed by a court on equitable grounds against one who has obtained property by
wrongdoing, thereby preventing the wrongful holder from being unjustly enriched. Such a trust creates no fiduciary
duty.” Id. at 723-24.
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Id. at *9.
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Id.
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Id. at *10.
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Id.

53

unpaid as of New Era’s bankruptcy petition. 362 Also like the Nature Conservancy, some of One to
One’s funds were deposited in a segregated account. 363 One to One asserted that it held a
$9,081,242.00 claim against the estate, whereas the trustee asserted that One to One held a
pecuniary claim worth $1,077,066.00. 364
Much like the agreement proposed with the Nature Conservancy, the trustee proposed that
One to One should receive a portion of the segregated funds in the amount of $1,600,000.00 and
hold a subordinated claim for $400,000.00 against the estate. 365 The One to One proposed
settlement agreement (as well as the one for the Nature Conservancy) also included a release
provision for future claims (but not present and future players) who may have aided or participated
in the scheme. 366 Hoping to place One to One in the group settlement category rather than
litigating the issue of the rights of the segregated funds, the trustee decided to “conced[e] the funds
in the segregated accounts to One to One, in return for [One to One’s] participation in the group
settlement as a positive who is agreeing to repay its 85% of its net positive obligation.” 367
Although many similarities existed between the Nature Conservancy settlement agreement
and One to One’s settlement agreement, significant differences remained. One to One’s situation
differed from the Nature Conservancy’s because One to One sought to exchange its potential of
prevailing on its segregated funds claim (which would render One to One a net positive) in
exchange for remaining outside of the group settlement and keeping a subordinated claim for
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.

365

Id. at *11.
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Id.

367

Id. at *13-14.
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$400,000.00. 368 This is different from the Nature Conservancy because the trustee does not
consider the Nature Conservancy to be a net positive in any calculable situation. 369
c. Reasonableness of Both Agreements
The trustee defended the reasonableness of the proposed settlement agreements on two
grounds: (1) the potential costs of litigation could be extraordinary and (2) the estate could
potentially lose the rights to the segregated accounts. 370 In addition to avoiding the costs of
litigation, the trustee argued that approving this settlement agreement would likely encourage
others to follow suit to attempt settlement agreements with the estate. 371
“By virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 704, the trustee has the duty to liquidate estate assets as quickly
‘as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest’ and to examine, and, if appropriate,
object to claims raised against the estate.” 372 The motions for approving the two proposed
settlement agreements involved Fed. R. Bank. P. 9019(a), which required the trustee to seek court
approval. 373 This rule provides that a bankruptcy court has the “sound discretion” of approving a
proposed settlement agreement and should do so if the agreement is in the “best interest of the
estate.” 374 Although the bankruptcy court must approve or deny the proposed settlement
agreements, the trustee has the duty of proving that the agreement is fair. 375 In an analysis of
“fairness”, the bankruptcy court must not only acknowledge that compromise and expedience is
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Id. at *14.
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Id.
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Id. at *16.
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Id. at *17-18
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Id. at *18 (quoting In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 at *19.

Id. at *21 (discussing Fed. R. Bank. P. 9019(a)) (citing In re Neshaminy Office Bldg. Associates, 62 B.R. 798, 803
(E.D. Pa. 1986)).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 at *22; see Matter of AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
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favored because it reduces administrative costs of the case, 376 but also evaluate the “amount of
creditor support.” 377
Unlike the settlement agreements previously approved, 378 the two proposed agreements
involved segregated accounts. 379 Typically, it is nearly impossible for those who deposited money
in a scheme to trace their own funds when the funds are pooled into a commingled account. 380
However, because New Era placed some of the Nature Conservancy and One to One’s deposited
funds into segregated accounts, these two creditors could trace their funds and likely prevail on a
claim that their funds were held in a constructive trust. 381 “[G]enerally, the recipient of property
obtained by fraud does not obtain absolute title to it; instead, it may be subject to a constructive
trust for the defrauded party’s benefit.” 382 Pennsylvania law provides that constructive trusts are
equitable remedies. 383 “[I]t is well settled that where a constructive trust exists under state law, so
that the debtor holds only bare legal title to the property subject to a duty to reconvey it to the

376 In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 at *23 (citing In re Martin, 91 F.3d at 393; In re
Lakeland Development Corp., 48 B.R. 85, 90 (Bankr. D. Minn.) (and cases cited), aff’d without op., 782 F.2d 1084 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Spring Lake Park Partnership, 476 U.S. 1130 (1986)).

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 *23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. October 24, 1996) (citing In re
American Reserve Corp., 841 F.2d 161-62 (7th Cir. 1987); cf. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. French, 516 U.S.
824 (1995)).
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See generally In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1891 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1996).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 at *24.
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Id. at *25 (discussing Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924)).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 at *26-27.

Id. at *26 (quoting In re M&L Business Machine Co., Inc., 164 B.R. 148, 150 (D. Colo. 1994), aff’d 59 F.3d 1078
(10th Cir. 1995)).
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In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893 at *27 (citing Partrick & Williams Co. v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 456 A.2d 1348 (Pa. 1983); Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc., 320 A.2d 117 (Pa. 1974); In
re Gebco Invest. Corp., 641 F.2d 143, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1981) (in appropriate circumstances a constructive trust may be
imposed to prevent unjust enrichment); Stauffer v. Stauffer, 351 A.2d 236 (Pa. 1976) (same); Gee v. Eberle, 420 A.2d
1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (same); In re Cubbler, 17 B.R. 674, 677 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) ("a constructive trust is not
determined by reference to the intent of the parties but rather, is imposed despite the parties' intent. Generally, a
constructive trust arises whenever the courts find it necessary to meet the demands of justice, morality, conscience and
fair dealing")(footnotes omitted)).
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rightful owner, the estate will hold the property subject to the same restrictions.” 384 “Accordingly,
when the defrauded investor in a pyramid scheme is unable to prove that its deposit has been
retained by the debtor, as opposed to being commingled and possibly used to repay one or more
earlier investors, attempts at imposing a constructive trust have been rejected.” 385 However, if a
creditor can trace the deposited funds, then the creditor may establish equitable ownership, i.e., the
existence of a constructive trust. 386
In this situation, most of the funds deposited with New Era were commingled into one
account held by Prudential. 387 As such, creditors’ whose money was placed into the “grab bag”
account would be unlikely to identify or trace their own funds. 388 However, because the Nature
Conservancy and One to One had segregated accounts, they could likely trace their own funds and
establish a constructive trust. 389 Because of this likelihood, the trustee took into account the risks
of litigation. 390 Because the risks included a high potential of loss, this aspect weighed heavily in
favor of settlement.

In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 1996 B.R. LEXIS 1893, at *28 (citing In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 772 F.2d
462 (8th Cir. 1985); In re California Trade Technical Schools, Inc., 923 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1991) (property debtor held
in trust at time of bankruptcy petition is excluded from bankruptcy estate); In re Howard's Appliance Corp., 874 F.2d
88 (2d Cir. 1989) (property held in trust by debtor belongs to beneficiary of trust); Matter of Yakel, 97 B.R. 580 (D.
Ariz. 1989) (debtor's attorney holds portion of tort settlement payment in constructive trust for state agency as
reimbursement for agency's payment of debtor's medical expenses); In re Dobbs, 115 B.R. 258, 269 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1990); In re Vichele Tops, Inc., 62 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Goldberg v. New Jersey Lawyers' Fund, 932
F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 1991) (to establish rights in bankruptcy as a trust recipient, claimant must demonstrate that trust
relationship and its legal source exists)).
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Co., Inc., 53 B.R. 963, 984 (N.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd without op., 787 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Mark Benskin & Co.,
Inc., 135 B.R. 825 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991); In re Gherman, 103 B.R. 326, 332 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) ("Imposition of
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in the segregated accounts; while there would be no collection difficulties if the trustee did prevail, there would be
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Based on the likelihood of adverse litigation, the cost of litigation, and the “follow the
leader” effect of approving settlements, Judge Fox deemed the proposed agreements reasonable in
light of the circumstances. 391 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court approved the compromised
settlement agreements. 392
e. Final Settlement
A little more than one year after New Era filed for bankruptcy, the trustee presented Judge
Fox with a comprehensive agreement to settle with the majority of “victims.” 393 “U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Bruce I. Fox approved a $39 million settlement August 22[, 1996,] that . . . allowed agencies
that lost money through New Era to receive as much as 65 cents on every dollar invested – much
of that money coming from organizations that profited from New Era’s dealings.” 394 Considered a
creative, ingenious document, the settlement agreement reduced the amount lost in New Era’s
estate from $500 million to $135 million, thereby minimizing the costs of the Ponzi.
2. U.S. v. Bennett
In addition to the bankruptcy proceedings, the New Era debacle brought about numerous
criminal proceedings. By mid-May 1995, the Pennsylvania Attorney General brought an 82-count
indictment against Bennett. 395 The indictment alleged as follows:
1. Count One-Bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
2. Counts Two-Third-five-Mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343.
some costs and delays involved in the litigation; and no creditor other than PSI - which holds a contingent claim opposes these settlement terms. Indeed, general creditor interests are enhanced for reasons detailed in my approval of
the group settlement proposal.”).
391
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Id. at *38.

Settlement Agreement, In re Foundation for New Era, Nos. 95-13729 and 95-0237 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Pa. July 21,
1997).
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Settlement Reached in New Era Case, supra note 221.

395 Berger, supra note 75 (noting that by mid-May, the Pennsylvania Attorney General indicted Bennett for fraud). See
generally PACER Criminal Docket for Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett).
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3. Count Thirty-Six-False statement to the government, 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
4. Counts Thirty-seven-Thirty-nine-False tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7206.
5. Count Forty-Impending the Internal Revenue Service, 26 U.S.C. § 7212.
6. Counts Forty-one-Five-five-Money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
7. Counts Fifty-six-Eighty-two-Money laundering to promote scheme, 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(A)(1). 396
Given the list of charges, Bennett originally faced up to 907 years in prison as well as a $28 million
fine. 397 Judge Edmund Ludwig set Bennett’s bail at $100,000, which Bennett promptly made. 398
The United States’ case against Bennett lasted until October 1, 1999, when the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 399 Although no full criminal trials ensued, numerous evidentiary
and sentencing issues arose during the four-year course of the trial. 400
Perhaps overcome by his circumstances, Bennett initially entered a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity on October 1, 1996. 401 His “religious fervor” defense was largely based on

United States v. Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d 236, 236-37 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Several of the money laundering charges are
based on [defendant’s] expenditures to promote New Era. Other[s] result from [his] purchases . . . of homes for
himself and his children, luxury cars, and first-class world-wide travel.”).

396

397

Settlement Reached in New Era Case, supra note 221; Man Accused in Charity Scheme Faces 82 Charges, supra note 33.

PACER Criminal Docket for Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett) (“Order dated 1/3/96 setting conditions
of release as to John G. Bennett, Jr., bail set at $100,000.00 secured by property known as 313 Norris Hall Lane,
Norristown, PA with agreement of forfeiture; deft to remain at this residence by curfew between the hours of 8:00
P.M. to 8:00 A.M. 7 days a week and subject to electronic monitoring, travel restricted to EDPA. With permission to
visit friends in JN, permitted once a month to Harvard for medical appointments as to medical psychiatric treatments,
etc.”).

398

The case was originally assigned to Judge Marjorie O. Rendell; however, on October 1, 1996, the case was
reassigned to Judge Edmund V. Ludwig. PACER Criminal Docket for Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett).
Judge Ludwig presided throughout the remainder of the USA v. Bennett while the case remained in the district court.
See PACER Criminal Docket for Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett).
399

Bennett v. United States, 528 U.S. 819 (1999).

400

See generally infra Part III.b. (discussing the various cases of United States v. Bennett).

PACER Criminal Docket for Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett); see Settlement Reached in New Era Case,
supra note 221 (discussing Bennett’s plea of not guilty).

401
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Bennett’s subjective belief that he was doing God’s will. 402 Contrary to Bennett’s defense, a court
appointed forensic psychiatrist evaluated Bennett and found that he was competent to stand
trial. 403 The judge expeditiously ruled that the insanity defense would not be allowed. 404 Shortly
after the judge’s ruling, Bennett changed his plea from not guilty to nolo contendre. 405 Bennett’s
attorney, Gregory P. Miller, opined that the judge’s initial ruling against Bennett made it impossible
for him to prevail on a not guilty plea. 406 Upon the changed plea, Judge Ludwig set Bennett’s
sentencing hearing for June 26, 1997, and requested that the government provide Guidelines based
calculation recommendations. 407 Even though Judge Ludwig ruled against Bennett’s attempted
insanity defense, Bennett sought to introduce evidence regarding his lack of mental culpability to
commit the fraud because of his delusions. 408

United States v. Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d 236, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also Carnes, New Era’s Bennett to Prison, supra
note 9 (“Bennett’s defense team says he was driven not by criminal intent but by unrestrained ‘religious fervor,’ a
defense strategy the judge did not allow.”). As previously mentioned, Bennett explained that “[a]s the years passed by,
the desire became a dream, the dream became a need, the need became an obsession, the obsession became a fantasy,
and the fantasy became a delusion.” Carnes, Bennett ‘Dream’ Became ‘Delusion’, supra note 9.

402

Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 236 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) & (b)). The court appointed Gary M. Glass, M.D. “to
aid the court in sentencing.” PACER Criminal Docket for Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett).

403

Bennett changed his plea from not guilty to nolo contendre on March 27, 1997. PACER Criminal Docket for Case
#2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett). This change of pleading is made possible by F.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2). Id.

404

Voices’ defense denied in fund raising fraud case, supra note 180; Tony Carnes, New Era’s Bennett Pleads ‘No Contest’ to Fraud,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, 1997 (“Bennett’s ‘no contest’ plea on 82 fraud charges followed a federal judge’s rejection of
his ‘religious fervor’ defense.”). Bennett officially changed his plea on March 27, 1997. PACER Criminal Docket for
Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett).
405

406

Carnes, New Era’s Bennett Pleads ‘No Contest’ to Fraud, supra note 405.

Id. Enacted by Congress in 1987, the Sentencing Guidelines were a result of the Federal Sentencing Act of 1984.
John D. Burrow & Barbara A. Koons-Witt, Elderly Status, Extraordinary Physical Impairments, and Intercircuit Variation, 11
ELDER L. J. 273 (2003). The Guidelines were proposed with the hopes of achieving three objectives: “(1) honesty in
sentencing; (2) uniformity in sentencing; and (3) proportionality in sentencing.” Id. at 279.

407

See generally Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (discussing the admissibility of medical evidence relating to Bennett’s
mental capability).

408
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a. Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing -- United States v. Bennett, 29 F.
Supp. 2d 236, 240 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
Even though Bennett changed his plea from defense by reason of insanity to nolo
contendre, Bennett sought to present evidence regarding his mental culpability to actually commit
the crimes. 409 As Judge Ludwig’s opinion explains:
According to defendant’s mental health experts . . . defendant, who is now
age 59, is suffering from a severe personality disorder and also from brain
dysfunction or cognitive damage –‘slippage’-resulting from automobile
accident head traumas a number of years ago. These conditions, [the
expert’s] maintain, were accompanied by his delusion, or fantasy, that there
were anonymous donors whose contributions would make New Era
economically feasible. [The experts] portray defendant as having a sincere
and genuine belief that he was doing God’s will and that New Era was a
“Kingdom Focus” to end suffering and ameliorate the world for God’s
glory. 410
The government’s experts disagreed with the diagnoses by Bennett’s experts and objected to the
admissibility of such evidence based of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). 411 In United States v.

See generally Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (noting that “[t]he issues relate solely to mens rea and not to the defense of
insanity”); Voices’ defense denied in fund raising fraud case, supra note 180.
409

Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 238; see also Carnes, New Era’s Bennett Pleads ‘No Contest’ to Fraud, supra note 405 (“In March,
Bennett’s attorneys told [Judge] Ludwig that Bennett suffered from an ‘unchecked religious fervor’ that caused him to
believe that his promise to double investors’ money with matching funds from nonexistent ‘anonymous donors’ was
not fraud but his ‘mission from God to change the world.’ Defense witness Robert L. Sadoff, director of forensic
psychiatry at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, said Bennett, though sane, suffered from a ‘kingdom
focus’ and believed that God talks to him ‘telling him what he must do.’”). Gregory Miller, Bennett’s attorney,
explained, “the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong, but was so overtaken by voices claiming he
was on a ‘mission from God’ that he believed he was above the law.” Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (discussing
Bennett’s motion for an insanity plea); see also Voices’ defense denied in fund raising fraud case, supra note 180 (“Bennett had
planned to argue a personality disorder and brain damage from two car accidents had turned him into a religious zealot
who did not believe his actions were wrong.”).

410

Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d 236, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also Carnes, New Era’s Bennett Pleads ‘No Contest’ to Fraud, supra
note 405 (“[Dr.] Sadoff[, a physician examining Bennett,]testified that Bennett suffered from a mixed personality
disorder that involved narcissism, obsessive compulsive behavior, and mood cycles aggravated by brain damage –
which the defense said Bennett received from two auto wrecks. Martin Kelley, a prosecution psychiatrist from
Harvard Medical School, replied that a barrage of tests over four months showed that Bennett faked his mental illness.
The judge ruled against allowing the defense’s line of reasoning because it amounted to trying to argue that Bennett
was both sane and insane at the same time.”). Judge Ludwig noted that these questions were governed by Federal Rule
of Evidence 704(b), which states that the expert can testify to the mental health of the examinee, but may not testify as
to whether the defendant actually had the required mental state at the time the crime was committed. Bennett, 29 F.
Supp. 2d at 239; see also United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 670-71 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing the applicability of rule
704(b) to a police officer’s testimony); United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 1580 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
admissibility of a psychiatrist’s testimony regarding defendant’s schizophrenia).

411
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Bennett, Judge Ludwig of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that experts could provide
testimony in relation to Bennett’s mens rea, but could not provide opinions concerning whether
Bennett actually had the requisite mens rea when committing the crime. 412
Upon his ruling, Judge Ludwig explained the parameters of Rule 704’s evidentiary
limitations. 413 Rule 704 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. 414 Although a defendant’s
morality may be relevant to an insanity defense, Judge Ludwig noted that the defendant would be
required to show how the morality affected the defendant’s state of mind. 415 In this case, Bennett
dropped his insanity plea, and, as such, “defendant is presumed . . . to have acted knowingly and
with awareness of the consequences of his actions.” 416 Admissible evidence must directly relate to
one of the elements of the crime. 417 The court held:
The generalized conclusion, without more, that defendant believed he was
doing God's work is not sufficient to negate the mens rea of statutory
willfulness. What it tends to prove-the morality or goodness of defendant’s
conduct-is not necessarily inconsistent with a guilty mens rea. It does not by
itself tend to show that the alleged violation, here the filing of false tax
returns, was not voluntary or intentional or was not a violation of a known
legal duty. 418
412

Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 240.

413

Id.

414

See Fed. R. Evid. 704. In its entirety, the Rule states:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal
case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are
matters for the trier of fact alone.

Id.
Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40 (“But, by itself, moral rectitude, regardless of the supremacy of the authority for
such approbation, will not negate mens rea. Here, too, it is necessary for defendant to show how God’s influence or
direction fits into a legally acceptable theory that he lacked the state of mind at issue.”).

415

416

Id. at 240 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 17; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952)).

417

Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 241.

418

Id.
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Thus, the defense could offer evidence related to Bennett’s mental state so long as the evidence
was directly related to “the actual mens rea for the particular crime charged in the indictment.” 419
b. Sentencing Hearing
Based on the government’s recommendations, independent medical evaluations, and the
Sentencing Guidelines, on September 22, 1997, Judge Ludwig sentenced Bennett to 144 months in
prison followed by three years of supervised release. 420 Dissatisfied with his sentence, Bennett
appealed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 421 Following Bennett’s
notice of appeal, Judge Ludwig filed a memorandum opinion on May 27, 1998, discussing the
enhancement factors and downward departures that played a role in assessing the 144-month
sentence. 422
a. United States v. Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Pa.
1998).
After noting that Bennett orchestrated the “largest charity fraud in history,” Judge Ludwig
provided his reasons for Bennett’s sentence. 423 This opinion included a discussion of the
enhancement factors and downward departures that affected Bennett’s sentence.
1. Enhancement Factors
First, Judge Ludwig addressed the eighteen level enhancement based upon the sheer amount
of loss. 424 Noting that the amount of fraud must be calculated at the time the fraud is realized, the

419

Id.

420

PACER Criminal Docket for Case #2:96-cr-00503-EL-1 (USA v. Bennett).

Id. Bennett filed his motion to vacate the sentence based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. During these proceedings the
U.S. attorney originally prosecuting the case, Richard Goldberg, withdrew as counsel and Judy Smith took over the
state’s case against Bennett. Id. In addition to being dissatisfied with his sentence, Bennett was also seemingly
dissatisfied with his original attorney because he filed his notice of appeal pro se from prison on October 2, 1997. Id.
By April 27, 2006, however, during the appeal process, the court appointed Gino I. Benediti to represent Bennett
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. Id.

421

422

See Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 241; United States v. Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1998).

423

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
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court explained that the criminal’s intention is irrelevant, so the Sentencing Guidelines did not take
into account whether Bennett thought he was doing God’s work. 425 “‘A wrongdoer should [not]
completely escape a sentence enhancement if his scheme involve[d] a substantial risk of loss merely
because, under his own rosy scenario, no loss was intended.’” 426 Given the lack of collateral in the
check-kite scheme, New Era’s program had a significant risk of loss. 427 When the scheme was
discovered, experts estimated that the amount of loss exceeded $100 million. 428 Because the total
amount of loss at the time of discovery exceeded $80 million, eighteen levels were added pursuant
to the Guidelines upper limit. 429
Secondly, Bennett’s sentence was enhanced because “more than minimal planning” was
involved. 430 At least one court has noted:
“More than minimal planning” means more planning than is typical for commission of the
offense in a simple form. . . . [It] also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to
conceal the offense . . .
“More than minimal planning” is deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a
period of time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely opportune. Consequently, this
adjustment will apply especially frequently in property offenses. 431

424

Id. (citing U.S.S.G § 2F1.1(b)(1)(S)).

425

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 518; see also United States v. Shaffer, 35 F.3d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1994).

426

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (quoting United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 799 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1994)).

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (“A lack of collateral usually means a substantial risk of loss.”); see also Shaffer, 35 F.3d at
114 (noting that collateral does not exist in check-kite schemes).

427

428

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 519-20.

429

Id. (citing U.S.S.C.§ 2F1.1(b)(1)(S)).

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (“The conduct at issue lasted over a period of six years and involved a complex and
recurrent pattern of activity.”) (citing U.S.C.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A)); see United States v. Marcum, 16 F.3d 599, 603 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 845 (1994) (“The comments to the guidelines deem more than minimal planning' to be
present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely
opportune.”).
430

431

United States v. Bean, 859 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Ind. 1994) (quoting U.S.S.G. 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1).
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Because Bennett continued his scheme for nearly six years and involved numerous innocent
individuals, the New Era Ponzi clearly involved “more than minimal planning.” This aspect of
Bennett’s sentencing was not contested even though it added two levels to Bennett’s sentence. 432
Thirdly, Bennett’s sentence was enhanced for “misrepresentation of [New Era] acting on
behalf of a charity.” 433 Although this aspect only added two levels to Bennett’s sentence, Bennett
hotly contested this enhancement. 434 Bennett argued that he never misrepresented that he worked
for a charity. 435 Because Bennett micro-managed New Era and New Era failed to file proper
statements regarding the organization’s operations, the court found that Bennett’s “claim that he
was unaware of New Era’s financial operations [was] incomprehensible and not credible.” 436
Throughout its operation, Bennett lied to investors, staff, accountants, and his attorneys about the
existence of a board of directors and the nature of the company. 437 These lies “facilitated the

432

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 520.

433

Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A)). The prosecution’s pre-sentence report explained:
The misrepresentation took place in three ways. First, the defendant was able to secure a favorable
rating from the Internal Revenue Service for the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy as a
charitable organization, by submitting fraudulent documentation to the IRS, and by failing to
disclose information regarding the New Concepts program to the IRS. The defendant did this
knowing that the New Concepts program was in fact, a fraudulent scheme. The second aspect of the
misrepresentation was the New Concept program itself, wherein the defendant told the victims of
non-existent anonymous donors, in an effort to solicit contributions from them. In addition, the
defendant used the favorable rating that he fraudulently received from the IRS to solicit funds from
the victims. The third aspect to the misrepresentation is that the defendant used the charitable image
of New Era to divert several million dollars to his for profit companies, which ultimately benefitted
the defendant personally. Pursuant to § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A), two levels are added.

United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1998).
434

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 520.

Id. (“Defendant asserts that he never ‘misrepresented’ his authority on behalf of New Era and that New Era was a
‘bona fide organization … which carried out its charitable grant-making function as represented.”).

435

Id. The court explained that his defense was incredible because Bennett “micro-managed” his companies. Id. “He
was an active and forceful CEO who created and organized his companies in his own image. He put together the
programs, laid out all policies and directed their implementations, and selected personnel. He retained and conferred
with attorneys and accountants. He solicited and met with representatives of potential investors and made or
approved all major corporate decisions.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

436

437

Id. at 521.
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success of [New Era’s] illegal operation.” 438 Because Bennett continually lied to maintain New
Era’s façade as a charity, the court refused to lower its two level enhancement for misrepresenting
New Era as a charitable organization. 439
Fourth, Bennett contested the addition of four levels because “[t]he offense affected a
financial institution and defendant derived more than $1 million in Gross Receipts.” 440 As for the
“financial institution” aspect of this enhancement factor, Bennett operated his scheme through
various bank accounts, most notably, those accounts held by Prudential. 441 Prudential is a
securities firm, thereby making it a “financial institution.” 442 During the five and a half year
operation, Bennett clearly derived more than $1 million. 443 New Era transferred more than $4
million to either Bennett’s personal accounts or to Bennett’s other for-profit companies. 444 More
than $2 million directly paid for Bennett’s personal investments, car, travel expenses, and home. 445
“As computed by the government auditor, the total of salary paid defendant, together with
payments to his family members, Mainline Travel Agency, Merrill Lynch Investments, a Lexus
dealership, personal credit card accounts, and for baseball tickets came to $2,449,960.”446
Accordingly, Judge Ludwig assessed the four level enhancement suggested by the government. 447

438

Id.

439

Id.

Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(6)(B)). These financial institutions included not only Prudential Securities, but also
Founders’ Bank and the National Bank of the Main Line. Id.

440

441

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 521.

442

Id.

443

Id.

Id. “In the words of a government auditor, $4,208,637 was transferred from New Era to ‘entities in which 100
percent interest is to John G. Bennett, Jr.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 3.B1.1(b), 18 U.S.C.A..

444

445

Id.

446

Id.

447

Id.
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Bennett also contested a four level increase for being the “organizer . . . of a criminal activity
that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” 448 This enhancement factor
requires that the defendant acted as a “leader” of an organization or that the defendant supervised
others. 449 Although there were numerous “participants” in one sense given the number of
investors, the New Era scheme had only two “criminal participants”: Bennett and Andrew
Cunningham. 450 As an independent accountant, Cunningham kept the books and prepared taxes
for New Era. 451 Other members were indeed involved in the scam; however, the “ostensibly
innocent individuals” who were crucial in New Era’s operation were unaware of the criminal
nature of the scheme. 452
As an illustration – defendant’s assistant, acting at his behest, did not give the
monthly “payment schedules” to New Era’s lawyers and accountants who had
asked for them. She also withheld the list of New Era’s board members.
Defendant utilized the services of several respected outside attorneys and
accountants. Their work products, which gave defendant's companies the
imprimatur of legality and reliability, reflected the carefully delimited
information supplied to them by defendant. Moreover, he specifically
directed Prudential Securities employees who handled investor inquiries not to
divulge the non-segregated nature of these so-called “escrow” accounts. 453
448

Id.

Id. (“This enhancement does not apply to a solitary offender. See United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 934 (3d
Cir. 1992). Also, in order to be a "leader," defendant must supervise others, not simply be on equal footing with them.
See United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1405 (3d Cir. 1992) (application of enhancement requires both "multiple
participants and some differentiation in their relative culpabilities"). "Otherwise extensive" criminal activity is "based
primarily on the number of people involved, criminally and noncriminally, rather than on other possible indices of the
extensiveness of the activity." See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, Application Note 3: "In assessing whether an organization is
otherwise extensive,' all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered." See also United
States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1997) (relying upon Application Note 3).”).

449

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 522. “‘Participant’ is specifically defined in the Commentary to the Guidelines as ‘a person
who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.’” Badaracco, 954
F.2d at 934 n. 4 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1).

450

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 522. Cunningham also kept the books and prepared taxes for BGI, another of Bennett’s
companies. Id. at n.22.

451

Id. Some of these “ostensibly innocent individuals” who were instrumental in the New Era operation include:
Mary Sinclair, who served as the Vice President for Administration; Tracy Ryan, the Assistant to the President and
Garnts Administration; Bill Bennington, the Executive Associate for U.S. Programs; Richard Ohman, the Executive
Associate for International Programs; Mark Staples, the Program Officer; Kristin Bennett, the Program Officer; and
Donna Ebert, the Program Manager and Institute Administrator. Id. (citing Tr. Sept. at 73-75).

452

453

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 522-23 (internal citations omitted).
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Because Bennett used “13 innocent individuals to assist in the commission of the crimes for which
he was indicted,” the court’s four-level enhancement stuck. 454 Thus, Judge Ludwig’s enhancement
was not based on his use of “five or more criminal participants.”
Rather, Bennett’s enhanced sentence was for otherwise extensive criminal activity.
“‘Otherwise extensive’ criminal activity is ‘based primarily on the number of people involved,
criminally and noncriminally, rather than on other possible indices of the extensiveness of the
activity.’” 455 “‘In assessing whether an organization is otherwise extensive,’ all persons involved
during the course of the entire offense are to be considered.” 456 This means that even a small
fraud that is orchestrated by two people may be otherwise extensive when it involves the services
of others. 457 As such, Bennett’s enhancement was based on the fact that he was the “manager” or
“supervisor” of otherwise extensive criminal activity. 458 Because Bennett clearly played a
supervisory role in constructing and micro-managing the Ponzi scheme, Judge Ludwig held that his
actions fell within the gambit of the enhancement. 459 Even though Bennett may have been

454

Id. at 523.

455

Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1).

456

Id. at 522 (citing United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1997)).

See generally U.S.S.G. § 3B1.b cmt. 3; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 11-12, Fullwood v. United States, No. 3-746
(Nov. 6, 2003), available at 2003 WL 22867720 (“In the light of the use of these unknowing participants, the “otherwise
extensive” application was not clearly erroneous. United States v Davis, 226 F. 3d 346, 360 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1181 (2001), held that applying the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement was not clearly erroneous because of the
involvement of unwitting accomplices where the defendant operated “an advance-fee scheme in which he would agree
to obtain funding for clients, but would never do so”. Id. at 348-49. There, the scheme involved employees of a
financial company, loan brokers, lawyers, and those providing “due diligence” reports. Id.; see also United States v.
Sidhu, 130 F. 3d 644 (5th Cir 1997) (§ 3B1.1 applied to physician involved in health care fraud where patients and
insurance company's employees were unknowing participants); United States v. Allibhai, 939 F. 2d 244, 253 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992) (§ 3B1.1 applied to scheme involving only four participants that used services
of outsiders such as bank employees). The use of unsuspecting participants was similarly extensive here. Application
of the enhancement on that basis was not clearly erroneous.”).

457

458

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 524

Id. Although Bennett’s challenges did not make it to the Supreme Court, this “otherwise extensive criminal
activity” approach has been adopted by at least one appellate court. See generally United States v. Appt, 354 F.3d 1269
(10th Cir. 2004). In Appt, the Tenth Circuit:

459
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propelled to “save the world,” he did so using fraud, which triggered an enhancement for
“otherwise extensive activity.” 460
The court also increased Bennett’s base level by two for abusing a position of trust. 461 As
the court noted, “this enhancement applies when a defendant occupies a position of trust and uses
that position in a way that significantly facilitates the commission of the crime.” 462 Bennett was the
founder and CEO of New Era. 463 As such, he occupied a “position of trust” in a fiduciary
relationship with the investors. 464 In this position, Bennett continually lied and misrepresented the
nature of the Foundation and the construction of the board. 465 He used his position, capitalized
on the falsely obtained tax-exempt status and garnered new support for the Ponzi. 466 Because
Bennett continually used lies to “develop and encourage trust” in the organization, Judge Ludwig
reasoned that this enhancement factor applied. 467

held that a sentence enhancement based on the defendant's role as a manager or supervisor of a
criminal activity including fraud and money laundering in connection with the operation of a Ponzi
scheme was supported by evidence that the defendant was the principal architect of the scheme and
by his role as a vice president of an investment business central to the scheme. The court found that
the defendant's extensive involvement supported the inference that the defendant played a
supervisory role with respect to the participants below him in the organization.
Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Construction and Application of U.S.C.G. § 3B1.1(b), 18 U.S.C.A., Providing Sentencing
Enhancement for Manager or Supervisor of Criminal Activity-Fraud Offenses, 22 A.L.R. FED. 417 (2007).
Additionally, in U.S. v. Murad, 954 F. Supp. 722 (D. Vt. 1992), the court held that months of planning
a bankruptcy fraud, evidenced by numerous falsified documents constituted “otherwise extensive” criminal
activity within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).
Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 524. (“While defendant may have been impelled by his intense hopes to ‘Save the World,’
he not only was aware that monies were entrusted to New Era, but he also took fraudulent steps to develop and
encourage that trust.”).

460

461

Id. at 27.

462

Id. at 27 (quoting United States v. Craddock, 933 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1993)).

463

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 527.

464

Id.

465

Id.

466

Id.

467

Id.
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Bennett tried to blame the naivety of others rather than taking full responsibility for his
actions. 468 Although Bennett argued that the “investors were greedy and, therefore, took their
chances,” “‘taking advantage of a victim’s self-interest does not mitigate the seriousness of
fraudulent conduct.’” 469 Additionally, Bennett tried to slough off blame onto Cunningham and
Prudential. 470 However, the court was disinclined to hear this excuse and “flatly rejected” his
defense-“[t]hat reputable professionals, at his request, assisted him in carrying out these offenses
hardly diminishes his role in them. If anything, the more cogent conclusion is to the contrary.” 471
While addressing adjustment factors for Bennett’s role in the Ponzi, Judge Ludwig
followed the prosecution’s recommendation and denied the requested adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility. 472 According to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, a sentence may be adjusted for a defendant’s

468

See generally id. at 528-29 (discussing the role of greedy investors and Cunningham).

469

Id. at 529 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 Commentary).

470

Id.

Id. In sum, the court noted, “As repletely shown by the evidence, defendant knowingly, purposefully, and
repeatedly misrepresented the nature and characteristics of the matching program in order to market it and effectuate
large scale participation.” Id.

471

472

Id. at 532. The prosecution’s pre-sentence report stated:
The defendant has entered a plea of nolo contendere in this case. However, he continues to deny any
factual guilt and criminal intent for his actions. In his press release dated March 26, 1997, announcing
his plea of nolo contendere, the defendant stated that he does not admit or adopt as true, the
government's version of the facts, insofar as those facts relate in any way to the issue of his intent to
commit the crimes alleged in the Indictment. The defendant further stated in his press release that he
believes that his choice to cooperate with the bankruptcy trustee by surrendering substantially all of
his assets to the trustee, which he claims had no relation to New Era, and to cooperate with the
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission regarding civil enforcement activities brought by those entities regarding the
collapse of New Era, indicates that he has accepted responsibility. It appears that his choice to
cooperate with the bankruptcy trustee and the other parties bringing civil action against him benefits
him in the same way as his plea of nolo contendere in the criminal matter. In other words, the
defendant arrives at an outcome which may have been inevitable anyway, but with much less negative
publicity and stress to himself and his family. His cooperation is not an indication that he admits
wrongdoing. In fact, he stated as much in his press release. Furthermore, the defendant's for profit
companies received approximately $7 million as a result of his fraudulent activities, which ultimately
resulted in benefit to him.

United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1998).
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acceptance of responsibility for his actions. 473 To obtain a reduction, the defendant must “‘clearly
demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for his offense.’” 474 In this situation, Bennett pleaded
nolo contendre. 475 Even though nolo is not a guilty plea, the court noted that such a plea “will not
‘categorically bar reduction for acceptance of responsibility.’” 476 More importantly to the court,
Bennett continually denied criminal intent and responsibility for his actions. 477 As the court stated,
“he demonstrated a non-recognition and non-acceptance of personal responsibility.” 478
Accordingly, the court refused to adjust Bennett’s sentence based on “acceptance of
responsibility.” 479
2. Downward Departures
In addition to the numerous enhancement factor requests, the Bennett Court ruled on
numerous downward departure requests as well. 480 Bennett was not granted a downward
departure based on his age, 481 nor was his request for a downward departure based on family and

473

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 529.

474

Id.

475

Id.

476

Id. (quoting United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
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Id.

479

Id.

480

See id. at 524-27.

Id. at 524. Downward departures for age are not commonplace. See generally Burrow & Koons-Witt, supra note __
(discussing the applicability of downward departures based on age for the increasingly elderly population). The
Burrow & Koons-Witt article notes that even though granting a downward departure based on age is within a judge’s
discretion, many “balk” at the notion of decreasing a criminal’s sentence simply because they are elderly. Id. In fact,
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 states:
481

Age (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted. Age
may be a reason to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly and infirm and where
a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than
incarceration. Physical condition, which may be related to age, is addressed at § 5H1.4 (Physical
Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addiction).
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 (2008). Typically, this downward departure may be requested when a defendant is over the age of
sixty. Id. at cmt. 3. In United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1997), the appellate court
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community ties or responsibility granted. 482 Third, Bennett’s employment record did not warrant a
downward departure. 483
In contrast to the three downward departures that were denied, three were also granted. 484
First, the court granted Bennett’s request for a downward departure based on prior good works. 485
Generally, the court should not consider a defendant’s “prior good works” when assessing a
sentence. 486 However, where a defendant’s community service history includes “truly
extraordinary circumstances,” the court can issue a downward departure. 487 Citing Bennett’s past
as a drug-rehab counselor, manager, and charitable fundraiser, the court stated, “the evidence

upheld a downward departure for a sixty-four year old male with heart disease, high blood pressure, arthritis,
ulcers, and prostatitis. The Collins Court noted that judge’s may rely on these factors so long as they are
“logically relevant” to the criminal history of the defendant. See generally Collins, 122 F.3d 1297. However, in
United States v. Marin-Castenada, 134 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1144 (1998), the Third
Circuit refused to grant a downward departure to a sixty-seven year old defendant simply because of his age.
Because using age as a downward departure is discouraged under § 5H1.4, many courts will not grant such a
request unless the defendant is elderly and has life-threatening health conditions.
Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 524. Much like downward departures based on age, departures based on family and
community ties and responsibility are generally discouraged factors for judges to consider. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 (2008).
See generally Harvey Wallace & Shanda Wedlock, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Gender Issues: Parental Responsibilities,
Pregnancy and Domestic Violence, 2 SAN DIEGO JUSTICE J. 395 (1994). Section 5H1.6 states that “family ties and
responsibility . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
guideline range.” U.S.S.G. 5H1.6 (2008). To receive a downward departure based on family responsibility, the
defendant’s family situation must be “extraordinary.” Wallace & Wedlock, supra. Although this is yet another
undefined term with legal ramifications, it is clear that the courts refuse to extend the downward departure absent
extreme circumstances. For example, in United States v. Archuleta, 128 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1997), the appellate court
reversed the lower court’s grant of a departure based on the defendant’s contention that she solely supported two
children and cared for her elderly, ill mother. The court determined that these were not circumstances “so
exceptional” that they constituted a downward departure. However, in United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.
2004), the court granted a downward departure for family responsibility to a defendant convicted of tax fraud. The
court determined that because the father of four children, two of which were afflicted with cystic fibrosis, was required
to spend extraordinary amounts of time with his children in order to keep them healthy, a downward departure could
be granted. Roselli, 366 F.3d at 369.
482

483

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 525.

484

Id.

485

Id.

486 Marjorie A. Shields, Downward Departures under Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Community Service, 173 A.L.R. FED. 667
(2001).

See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 209 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Takai, 945 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Strange, 370 F. Supp. 2d 644 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (noting that the
defendant’s charitable works and mostly law-abiding life was not enough for a downward departure).
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demonstrated that defendant’s civic, charitable and public service and his good works were
exceptional.” 488 Accordingly, the court granted this downward departure.
Secondly, the court granted a downward departure based on Bennett’s “extraordinary
cooperation and restitution.” 489 Once Bennett realized the extent of the situation, he aided
prosecutors and the trustees in recovering funds. 490 He quickly turned over his home and assets,
and even the home he had given one of his daughters. 491 Based on Bennett’s cooperation and the
efforts of Trustee Arlin Adams and bankruptcy Judges Fox and Dalzell, the amount of loss was
“reduced from over $100 million to about $20 million.” 492 As a result of his cooperation, the court
granted this downward departure.
Finally, the court granted a downward departure for Bennett’s diminished capacity. 493
Numerous experts examined Bennett to determine his mental capacity, and many disagreed. 494
488

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 525.

489

Id. This downward departure is based on U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. It states:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the
guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are
not limited to, consideration of the following:
(1) The court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into
consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) The truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) The nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) Any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his
assistance;
(5) The timeliness of the defendant's assistance.

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (2008). This substantial assistance must be truthful, and if the government believes that the
defendant may be lying, a substantial assistance agreement may be properly avoided. See, e.g., United States v.
Johnigan, 90 F.3d 1332 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Waldrip, 948 F. Supp. 908 (D. Neb. 1996).
490

Bennett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 525.

491

Id.
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Id.

493

Id.
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However, the court reasoned that because Bennett truly believed that he was doing good works
and managed to convince others of his good intentions, he must have “been subject to some form
of extraordinary distortion and, perhaps, significantly reduced capacity.” 495 Accordingly, Judge
Ludwig reasoned that the request should be granted. 496
3. Public Response
Throughout the sentencing period, Judge Ludwig accepted victims’ letters to assist him in
determining the proper sentence for Bennett’s crimes. 497 The victims’ responses were far from
uniform, and some advocated the maximum sentence while others quickly forgave Bennett’s
misdeeds. 498 As previously mentioned, some donors lost faith in charity. 499 Others, such as former
Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, did not lose faith and truly believed that Bennett meant
to cause no harm. 500 Bennett’s pastor, C. Raymond van Pletsen, urged the court to go lightly on
Bennett because he was not a “con man” and was “truly repentant” for his misdeeds. 501 Still
others felt that, “No one who knows Bennett personally considered him a common criminal.” 502
Thus, taking into account the feelings of the victims involved, Judge Ludwig arrived at his decision.
4. Summary of Sentence Calculation
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Id.

495

Id.

496

Id.

497

Id.
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See generally Carnes, Bennett ‘Dream’ Became ‘Delusion,’ supra note 192 (discussing victim-impact letters).

Id.; see Neff, supra note 194 (“[t]he New Era scandal that washed over America’s nonprofits in May has damaged the
sense of trust that has developed through many years of ministry”).

499

Carnes, Bennett ‘Dream’ Became ‘Delusion,’ supra note 192 (“Yet William E. Simon, the former Secretary of the U.S.
Treasury and a New Era donor, said, ‘He believed he could match the funds he raised. I hope … he will be given the
opportunity to start anew.””).

500

501

Id. (discussing victim impact letters provided to the court).

Frame, The ‘Post-New Era’ Era: Ministries Band Together to Overcome Losses, supra note 24(noting that ‘[s]ome speculate
that Bennett is ‘addicted’ to giving”).
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Originally, Bennett faced up to 907 years in prison. 503 However, once he changed his plea
from not guilty to nolo and substantially assisted the government, Bennett significantly lowered the
amount of time he might have to spend in prison. Based on the Guidelines calculations submitted
by the prosecution, Judge Ludwig could have sentenced Bennett to twenty-four years in prison. 504
However, as previously discussed, the court granted various downward departures. Thus,
Bennett’s sentence was calculated as follows:
The sentence enhancements and adjustments for defendant’s role included:
•

18 additional levels for the amount of loss;

•

2 additional levels for “more than minimal planning;

•

2 additional levels for misrepresenting New Era as a charity;

•

4 additional levels for affecting the gross receipts of a financial institution in
excess of $1 million;

•

4 additional levels for being the leader of otherwise extensive criminal activity;
and

•

2 additional levels for abusing a position of trust.

As such, Bennett was placed in a range of between 235 and 293 months imprisonment. 505
However, Judge Ludwig “departed downward 91 months” based Bennett’s prior good works,
substantial assistance, and diminished capacity. 506 Accordingly, Judge Ludwig arrived at a sentence
of 144-months.
c. United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1998).
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See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
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Carnes, Bennett ‘Dream’ Became ‘Delusion,’ supra note 192.
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United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 179-85 (3d Cir. 1998).
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On appeal, Bennett raised two main issues: whether the court erred in its pretrial rulings
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony 507 and whether the district court properly weighed
the enhancement factors and downward departures in calculating an appropriate sentence. 508
Bennett had specifically reserved the second issue for appeal, from the first evidentiary hearing. 509
i. Evidentiary Issues
First, the Third Circuit addressed whether the district court correctly excluded expert
testimony concerning Bennett’s mental state. 510 Reviewing the district court’s decision for abuse of
discretion, Judge Scirica reviewed the confines of evidentiary rule 704. 511
Bennett sought to introduce psychiatric evidence about whether he:
(a) harbored the specific intent to defraud; (b) knew and believed that the tax returns
and other information given to the IRS were false; (c) knew the money he handled
represented the proceeds of criminal activity (as is required under the money
laundering statute); or (d) harbored the specific intent to promote illegal activity. 512
After summarizing much of the lower court’s reasoning, the appellate court held:
We believe the District Court properly excluded the questions asking whether
Bennett's mental disorders (1) “precluded him from forming the intent to defraud”;
(2) made it “highly unlikely that he could form the intent to defraud”; (3) made it
“unlikely that he would have engaged in conduct designed to defraud”; (4) precluded
him “from forming the specific intent to defraud individuals”; (5) made it “unlikely
that he could defraud the individuals and entities”; (6) “affect[ed] his ability to
knowingly and willfully submit false statements to the I.R.S.”; and (7) made “it
unlikely that he would knowingly and willfully submit false statements to the I.R.S.”
These questions go beyond merely assisting the jury, explaining the nature of
Bennett's mental disease, or describing the typical effect of Bennett's disorders on his
mental state. Instead, they require the expert witness to state expressly whether
Bennett possessed the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged in the
indictment. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court's
507

Id.

508

See id., at 185-99.

509

Id.

510

Id. at 182.

Id. (citing United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 345 (3d Cir. 1992); Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.3d 49,
51 (3d Cir. 1990)).

511
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Id.
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refusal to admit the questions. 513
As such, the Appellate Court denied Bennett’s request for reversal regarding the admissibility
of expert testimony and upheld its precedent in Pohlot. 514 Ultimately, the court explained that
Bennett sought to introduce evidence regarding how his mental disorders could affect his
criminal culpability; however, the court determined that making such a determination is
“exclusively within the province of the jury.” 515 Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court’s determination to limit the psychiatric testimony.
ii. Downward Departure Issues
Secondly, the court addressed Bennett’s concerns about the sentencing issues. 516 The court
began this portion of the opinion by noting that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) entitles the defendant to
“comment” regarding the proposed sentence. 517 Bennett complained that because Judge Ludwig

513

Id.

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 185 (discussing United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987)). The court furthered
explained:

514

Pohlot mentioned Rule 704(b), albeit briefly, in dicta:[T]he Senate Judiciary Committee wished to
abolish only diminished responsibility and capacity defenses not to abolish the use of psychiatric
evidence to disprove mens rea.A later portion of the Senate Report confirms this view of the
Committee's intent. In addition to changing the insanity defense, the Insanity Defense Reform Act
altered Federal Rule of Evidence 704 to prevent psychiatric experts from providing opinions on
ultimate issues. The Report explained: “The Committee has fashioned its Rule 704 provision to
reach all such ultimate issues, e.g., premeditation in a homicide case, or lack of predisposition in
entrapment.” Premeditation is, of course, an element of mens rea. If the Judiciary Committee had
intended § 17(a) to prevent psychiatrists from testifying about mens rea at all, its report would almost
certainly not have indicated its approval of psychiatric evidence on mens rea. Id. at 898-99 (citations
omitted).
Bennett, 161 F.3d at 185 n. 17.
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Id. at 185.
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Id.
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Id. In its entirety, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) states:
(1) Sentencing Hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the court must afford counsel for the defendant
and for the Government an opportunity to comment on the probation officer's determinations and
on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence, and must rule on any unresolved objections to
the presentence report. The court may, in its discretion, permit the parties to introduce testimony or
other evidence of the objections. For each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding
on the allegation or determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will
not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. A written record of these findings and
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filed the Sentencing Memorandum after the sentencing hearing, the memorandum should not be
considered. 518 The local rules provided that a judge may file an opinion within fifteen days of the
hearing, however, Judge Ludwig filed his opinion well after the fifteen day limit. 519 Despite
Bennett’s contention and citation of the local rules, the Third Circuit determined that Bennett was
not prejudiced by the court’s review of the Sentencing Memorandum given that he had ample
opportunity to respond to the document. 520 Accordingly, the Third Circuit reviewed the District
Court’s Sentencing Memorandum for the factual findings. 521
Finally, because the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding specific questions, limiting expert testimony, and the court made “sufficient findings of
fact” as required by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the appellate court upheld the district court’s
ruling. 522
d. Denial of Certiorari - Bennett v. United States, 528 U.S. 819
(1999).
Although the Third Circuit ruled against Bennett, he did not go down without a fight. 523
On June 4, 1999, Bennett petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari to determine
two issues: (1) whether “a federal criminal offense ‘affected a financial institution’ within the
determinations must be appended to any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau
of Prisons.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (2008).
518

Bennett, 161 F.3d 185-86 (discussing the local rule of appellate procedure regarding late filings).

519

Id. at 186. The rule at issue states, in pertinent part:
At the time of the filing of a notice of appeal, the appellant shall mail a copy thereof by ordinary mail
to the trial judge. Within 15 days thereafter, the trial judge may file and mail to the parties a written
opinion or a written amplification of a prior written or oral recorded ruling or opinion.

Bennett, 161 F.3d at 186 (citing 3d Cir. R. 3.1).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 198.

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari To the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Bennett v. United
States, 528 U.S. 819 (1999) (No. 98-1957)

523
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meaning of the 1990 Crime Control Act … and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act …, so as to trigger a substantial Sentencing Guidelines enhancement … if the
institution identified at sentencing was neither a victim nor a target of the offense” and (2) whether
the principles on lenity and strict construction should be applied to interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines. 524 However, as it does with so many cases, the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari, and the United States’ criminal case against Bennett came to a close. 525
3. SEC v. Bennett
In addition to the bankruptcy proceedings and the criminal fraud proceedings, Bennett also
faced charges from the SEC. 526 Tipped off from Meyer’s letter, the SEC filed suit against Bennett
and New Era on May 18, 1995. 527 The SEC “charged Bennett with misusing $55 million.” 528 In its
petition, the SEC asserted that Bennett not only “diverted more than $4 million to his own private
businesses,” but that he also “paid himself an average of more than $26,000 a week in consulting
fees.” 529 Though Bennett ultimately was found guilty the following hearings ensued in the SEC’s
case against the Ponzi scheme perpetrator.
a. Jurisdictional Hearing
On the same day that the SEC charged Bennett of the massive Ponzi scheme, the SEC
petitioned the court to enter a proposed negotiated consent injunction. 530 The proposed consent

524

Id.

Bennett v. United States, 528 U.S. 819 (1999). Bennett is currently serving his twelve-year sentence at Fort Dix in New
Jersey. Litigation Release No. 15637, Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 5, 1998), available at
http://classaction.findlaw.com/cases/securities/sec/sec1/files/1998/lr15637.html.
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SEC v. Bennett, 889 F. Supp. 804, 804 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 804; see also Berger, supra note 75 (noting that by mid-May, the SEC indicted Bennett for
fraud).
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Frame, The ‘Post-New Era’ Era: Ministries Band Together to Overcome Losses, supra note 24.

529

Id.
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Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 806.
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injunction had three major aspects: (1) freezing the assets controlled or owned by Bennett,531 (2)
requiring an update of Bennett’s assets so the freeze could be effective, and (3) restraining Bennett
from future violations of the Securities and Exchange Acts. 532 Upon reviewing the terms of the
agreed upon consent order, the Honorable Anita B. Brody, Federal Judge for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, determined whether the Ponzi scheme involved “securities,” thereby conferring
proper subject matter jurisdiction with the district court. 533
First, Judge Brody explained that the Securities and Exchange Acts confer jurisdiction
upon federal courts when the alleged fraud involves a “security.” 534 Because “security” is a term of
art, determining whether something meets the definition involves issues of both subject matter
jurisdiction and substantive law. 535 “Unlike a merits determination, the jurisdictional inquiry in a
federal question case asks not whether the ‘legal theory alleged is probably false,’ but only whether
‘the right claimed is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior [court decisions] or otherwise
completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’” 536 Noting that the “wholly
insubstantial” standard is based in part of the adversary nature of court proceedings, Judge Brody
explained that in New Era’s situation, the “adversary machinery [was] not functioning” because

531 Interestingly, the court noted that this did not include the assets of co-defendant New Era. Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at
806 n.1; see also Arenson, supra note 206 (noting that as of May 17, 1995, the Pennsylvania Attorney General planned to
freeze New Era’s assets).

Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 806. The original version of the consent order also provided for living expenses and
reasonable attorney’s fees for Bennett. Id. Although both the SEC and Bennett agreed to the amounts listed in the
original order, Judge Anita Brody indicated that she may not approve of the agreed upon living expense amount. Id.
As a result, these issues were severed from the negotiated consent order for an injunction against New Era and
Bennett agreed to petition the court separately regarding those issues. Id.

532

533

Id.

534

Id. at 807.

535

Id. (citing Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell, J.)).

Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 807 (quoting Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d. Cir. 1987)
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974) and Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)).
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Bennett agreed to the proposed negotiated order. 537 As such, issues concerning the substantive
nature of the “security” were not submitted for review, and Judge Brody asked that the parties
brief the court on whether the Ponzi scheme fit within the Securities and Exchange Acts’
definition of “security.” 538
According to federal law, “‘security’ includes ‘notes,’ ‘investment contracts,’ and ‘other
evidence of indebtedness.’” 539 The SEC contends that New Era’s Ponzi scheme fits within each of
these subsections of security, thereby conferring jurisdiction with the federal court. 540 First, the
court addressed whether the Ponzi fit within the definition of “note.” 541 Notes meet both the
definition of “note” and “security,” but the “security” definition is narrower than “note.” 542 Based
on a four-factor test from Reves v. Ernst & Young, 543 the SEC asserted, and Judge Brody agreed, that
the instruments used in New Era’s Ponzi scheme were “notes” within the meaning of securities
law. 544 The four-factor family resemblance test established by Reeves takes into account:
(1) the motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into [a
transaction], (2) the plan of distribution of the investment, (3) the reasonable expectation
537

Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 807.

538

Id. at 807-08.

539

Id. at 808 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10)).

540

Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 808.

541

Id.

Id. A “note,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary is “a written promise by one party (the maker) to pay money to
another party (the payee) or to bearer. A note is a two party negotiable instrument, unlike a draft.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed. 2000). A security, on the other hand, is:
542

The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security,’ or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.'
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 n. 3 (1946).
543

494 U.S. 56, 63-67 (1997).

544

Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 808.
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of the public, and (4) whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory
scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument thereby rendering applications of
the Securities Acts unnecessary. 545
Thus, if an instrument is in the same “family” or “resembles” a security, it may be considered a
security within the Securities and Exchange Acts. As such, the United States Supreme Court has
adopted the “if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it will be considered a duck”
approach to determining whether something is a security.
In applying Reves, the Bennett Court noted, “[f]irst, the SEC submits that New Era’s purpose
in issuing the “notes” was to finance itself and that the various participants’ purpose was to profit
from the 100% return assured by the notes.” 546 “Second, the SEC submits that the plan of
distribution here was like that of a ‘security’ because hundreds of individuals and institutions in the
United States were solicited by New Era and because over three hundred investors actually
participated in New Era’s ‘matching’ program.” 547 “Third, the SEC submits that the public could
reasonably expect that these notes were ‘securities’ because New Era described them as an
‘investment’ and because participants were told their funds were being placed at the well-known
brokerage firm of Prudential Securities, Inc.” 548 “Finally, the SEC points out that there is no
alternative regulatory regime that significantly reduces the risk of New Era’s ‘matching’ program
and that renders application of the securities laws unnecessary here.” 549 As such, the court found
that the Ponzi scheme involved “notes” within the definitions provided by securities law.550

American Bar Association, Committee on Business and Corporate Litigation, ANNUAL REVIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LITIGATION 37 (2005 ed.)
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Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 808.
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In addition to finding that New Era sold “notes,” the court determined that New Era may
have sold “investment securities” or engaged in “other evidence of indebtedness.” 551 The threepronged test for determining whether something constitutes an “investment contract” is set out in
Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co. 552 “The test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.” 553 In support of its contention that the New Era documents were investment securities,
the SEC asserted three arguments: (1) participants “invested” money by placing it with New Era,
(2) the deposited funds were a “common enterprise” because they “were pooled for a common
purpose,” and (3) the proceeds of the matching funds program were “procured through ‘the
efforts of others.’” 554 As such, the SEC alleged that the funds met the definition of “investment
contracts” within the meaning of the Act, and Judge Brody agreed. 555
Given the plethora of information submitted by the SEC regarding the nature of New Era
funds as “securities” within the meaning of securities law, Judge Brody concluded that the
“characterization of interests at issue here . . . surpasses Kulick’s ‘wholly insubstantial’ standard”
and the district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction. 556 As such, Judge Brody noted the
strong policy in favor of approving consent agreements unless they are “unfair, inadequate, or
unreasonable.” 557 Because the proposed consent order was clearly a cooperative effort and
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Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 808.

Id. The SEC also provided the court with information regarding whether New Era’s “note-like instruments” were
“other evidence of indebtedness.” Id. Although the court mentioned this assertion, it did not go into great detail
regarding the assertion.
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Id. (citing SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1984); X. Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation
4681 & n. 52 (3d ed. 1993); Thomas L. Hazen, Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Use of Injunctions and Other Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 450-51 (1979)).
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Bennett understood the terms, the Judge approved the consent injunction and entered the order
on June 12, 1995. 558
b. Motion to Dismiss Hearing
Following the negotiated consent order, Bennett filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. 559 Ultimately denying both of Bennett’s
motions to dismiss, the court explained that questions remained concerning whether the interests
invested in New Era were securities. 560 When dealing with rulings on motions to dismiss, the court
must take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and Judge Brody noted
that Bennett failed to unequivocally show that the interests were not securities within the meaning
of securities law. 561
Although the court denied Bennett’s 12(b)(6) motion, Judge Brody instructed the parties
that if the issue regarding whether the interests were securities were to come up on appeal, the
parties should address not only the “economic realties of the transaction,” but also the precedential
effect of making a ruling that these are securities. 562 Additionally, Judge Brody requested that the
parties address the “possible impact on foundations that disperse charitable contributions to other
charities of requiring them to register their instruments with the SEC.” 563 Addressing these factors
would take into account the economic realities of the situation.

Bennett, 889 F. Supp. at 808 (“The proposed consent injunction should be approved. It is not unfair or
unreasonable on its face, and it is evidently the product of substantial negotiation between Mr. Bennett and the SEC.
Moreover, Mr. Bennett’s counsel represented at the May 18, 1995, conference that they had reviewed it carefully with
Mr. Bennett and had advised him to sign it.”).
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Id. at 436 (“While a question may exist as to whether the instruments will ultimately qualify as securities under the
securities law, I am unable to say at this point that this very stringent test has been met, therefore, I will allow the case
to go forward and the parties to conduct discovery.”).
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Finally, the court addressed Bennett’s 12(b)(1) motion for dismissal, or, in the alternative,
that the SEC should file a more definite statement. 564 Bennett asserted that the SEC “ha[d] alluded
to theories of potential liability that [were] so set forth in its Complaint, [and] these theories [were]
so vague and ambiguous that [Bennett could] not frame a responsive pleading.” 565 The court
unsympathetically replied that Bennett failed to clearly point out the defects in the pleadings,
thereby failing to comply with 12(e), which required Bennett to “point out the defects complained
of and the details desired.” 566 As such, the court denied both of Bennett’s motions to dismiss and
enabled the parties to proceed. 567
c.

Final Judgment – SEC v. John G. Bennett, Jr. & the
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 95 Civ. 3005, U.S.D.C.
(E.D. Pa. 1998).

On February 4, 1998, Judge Brody issued the Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and
Other Equitable Relief by Consent. 568 Based largely on the same findings of fact as in the criminal
trial, the SEC alleged that “Bennett and New Era victimized hundreds of investors throughout the
nation, and wrongfully solicited more than $100 million . . . in 1995 alone.” 569 The final judgment
enjoins Bennett from future violations of the securities acts. 570 Additionally, the court “orders
Bennett to disgorge profits earned as a result of the conduct alleged . . . plus interest, in the total
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amount of $3,424,015. 571 Despite the court’s order, the fees were waived, given Bennett’s inability
to pay. 572
d. SEC’s fine against Prudential
In addition to its case against Bennett, the SEC fined Prudential for its role and oversights
in the New Era debacle. 573 The SEC assessed an $800,000 penalty against Prudential for “failing to
properly supervise the broker who handled New Era’s investment accounts.” 574 Additionally, the
SEC fined Stuart P. Biachi, the broker handling New Era’s accounts, $64,586, and assessed a
$15,000 fine against John C. Birch, Bianchi’s supervisor. 575 The SEC explained that Bianchi not
only failed to miss warning signs, but also “willfully aided and abetted” Bennett’s scam. 576
4. Museum of Jewish History v. Bennett
“On May 18, 1995, the Museum of Jewish History filed a class action complaint against the
purported directors and officers of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, and its
accountant.” 577 The plaintiff class alleged six violations: (1) Securities and Exchange Act
violations, (2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violations, (3) fraud, (4)
fiduciary duty breaches, (5) negligence, and (6) Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes Act
violations. 578 However, once New Era’s bankruptcy petition had been converted from a chapter
571
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PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 8, 2001, available at GALE Document No. A147060737.
573

574

Id.

575

Id.

Id. (“The commission said that Mr. Bianchi failed to tell investors that their money was not held in escrow or ‘quasiescrow’ accounts, as they were led to believe. Investors were also not informed that New Era’s president, John G.
Bennett, Jr., had borrowed money from Prudential using treasury bills purchased with investors’ money as collateral.”).
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11 petition to a chapter 7 petition, the plaintiff class (led by the Museum of American Jewish
History) filed a motion to withdraw because (1) the statute of limitations was unlikely run and (2)
the trustee would be able to adequately protect the interests of the class, who were creditors in the
chapter 7 case. 579 The Honorable Steward Dalzell of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania presided
to determine whether to allow the Museum of American Jewish History to withdraw its complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 580
In his opinion, Judge Dalzell explained that the Museum understated the “palpable risk
that the [t]rustee may not protect the creditors’ interests as the Museum sought to do as erstwhile
class champion.” 581 The court noted that the trustee has the power to bring a suit on behalf of the
creditors, but it also has the power to not bring a suit against New Era on behalf of the creditors. 582
Because the trustee would not be forced to bring an action against New Era’s management, Judge
Dalzell voiced concern that the statute of limitations may run before members of the plaintiff class
could assert a new claim against New Era. 583 Although Judge Dalzell made no suggestion as to
whether to assert or abandon the claims, he “hope[d] to create a clearer legal landscape with

579

Id.

Id. “Rule 41 generally allows plaintiffs to withdraw a complaint without court order ‘by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). The rule is subject to Rule 23(e),
however, which counsels that “[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).” Id. at n.1 (emphasis in original).
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Id. (“We only wish to emphasize that the [t]rustee clearly has the power not to assert such claims against New Era’s
management.”).
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respect to these claims for the putative class members, in fulfillment of our Rule 23(e) duty.” 584 As
such, the court allowed a conditional dismissal of the class action against New Era. 585
5. Messiah College v. Prudential
Although Bennett and New Era took the brunt of the heat from the fire caused by New
Era’s Ponzi scheme, other institutions also found themselves thrown into the fire. 586 Many
investors banded together to file a class action suit against Prudential for the lost investments. 587
“Documentation uncovered since New Era filed for bankruptcy establishes that Prudential … and
its employees acted inappropriately in using our funds to cover the exposure they had through
their dealings with New Era and John Bennett.” 588
In November 1996, thirty-three organizations filed suit against Prudential for its role in
perpetuating New Era’s Ponzi scheme. 589 Rather than choosing to fight the “victims,” Prudential
decided to settle the suit for $18 million that would be added to the “pool of money going to
reimburse New Era’s victims.” 590 This settlement agreement enabled victims to be able to likely
recover 85-90 percent of lost investments, as compared to roughly 65 percent without Prudential’s
settlement. 591

Id. Fed. R.. Civ. Pro. 23(e) provides: "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(e).
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the Museum has brought against defendants in this action; and … [n]otice to the class of dismissal of this action is not
required.” Id. at *6-7.
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6. United States v. Cunningham
On September 27, 1996, the government notified Andrew Cunningham that he would be
charged with aiding and abetting Bennett on criminal wire fraud and aiding and abetting Bennett’s
breaking of IRS laws. 592 Rather than awaiting indictment, Cunningham pled guilty to the felony
counts on October 15, 1996. 593 Cunningham was sentenced to thirty months imprisonment
followed by three years of supervised release. 594 Upset by the length of his sentence, Cunningham
appealed to Judge J.C. Joyner for a downward departure based on his “substantial assistance.” 595
Judge Joyner granted Cunningham’s motion for a downward departure on January 15, 1998. 596
V.

Lessons Learned

As Ralph Nader once said, “Your best teacher is your last mistake.” 597 Perhaps a positive
outlook on the Ponzi scheme would simply encourage investors (and potential investors) to learn
from the mistakes of the 1,100 charities and non-profits that invested with New Era. This Part
discusses various lessons that should be not only learned from the New Era debacle, but also
followed.
a. Just Because Someone Is Popular Doesn’t Mean You Should Swoon.
One of the most notable aspects of Bennett’s scam was his “clientele.” As one observer
noted, “it’s quite clear that victims of scams are not just little old ladies. A recent [American
Association of Retired Persons] survey found most victims of scams are well-educated, have
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above-average intelligence, and are socially active. Anyone can be a victim.” 598 Such statement
proved true with New Era. Bennett swindled financially savvy contributors such as Laurence
Rockefeller, Harvard University, former United States Treasury Secretary William Simon, and even
the well-known investor John Whitehead. 599 These big name participants lent credibility to
Bennett’s scheme and encouraged less sophisticated contributors to invest. 600
“Bennett passed muster with so many people we looked up to [that] we didn’t let these
questions cause us to withdrawal.” 601 Even though many were initially hesitant to invest, people
became much more comfortable once the initial investors were paid back. Robert Andringa,
president of the Coalition for Christian Colleges and Universities, stated that “attorneys and
auditors said [the matching program] was unusual and that they can’t give it a clean bill of
health.” 602 Despite their concerns, the Coalition still invested $350,000 with New Era, based, in
some part, on the list of investors. 603
Though investors usually make decisions individually, this seems like the old problem of
“groupthink.” Groupthink occurs when individuals who are surrounded by a group do not want
to “upset the herd,” so rather than voicing objections or concerns, they simply go along with the
group’s decision. 604 Once others back a charity, they continually give more credibility to its cause.
As one commentator noted of Jim Bakker’s PTL scheme: “The PTL scandal exhibited several
598
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Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 235 (2008) (“Groupthink delineates a set of
conditions and processes that leads groups toward an ‘extreme consensus-seeking’ tendency and thereby interferes
with critical thinking. Though unintentional and unacknowledged, the tendency causes “a deterioration of mental
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment.”).
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possible symptoms of groupthink, such as belief in the group’s inherent morality, rationalizations,
stereotyping adversaries, and pressures to conform.” 605 Similarly to victims of the PTL scandal,
investors quickly jumped to invest in New Era because New Era initially paid such incredible
returns and had a stellar list of investors. Had individual organizations stopped to evaluate the
investment, perhaps the smooth-talking salesman would have taken in fewer victims.
b. Exclusivity Does Not Mean Awesome Opportunity.
In the New Era Ponzi early days, Bennett was exclusive as to who he would allow to
participate. In the beginning, investors had to be “invited.” This exclusivity intrigued many
investors. Once New Era followed through on the original returns, the exclusivity attracted even
more potential investors. In fact, investors who were lucky enough to be involved in the funds
matching program became wary of angering Bennett. As previously mentioned, investors were
encouraged to not ask questions. As such, Bennett held a certain power over previous investors.
Perhaps some investors feel reminiscent about the days in middle school in which they
feared not being chosen for a dodge-ball team, but investors should remember that exclusivity
does not always mean that an opportunity is legit. In a Forbes article about swindlers, the author
notes “irresistible to babes in the financial woods, [is the notion] that there are invincible deals out
there available only to the big, sophisticated investors.” 606 Once investors are given the
opportunity to be a part of the “in-crowd,” they tend to throw caution to the wind.
c. Documentation is Key.
“[A]nyone handing over money to an outside organization should demand to see audited
financial statements. And if money is handed over to a matching grants program, participants
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should get documentation that the funds are held in escrow.” 607 Albert Meyer warns, “There is
simply no substitute for certified, audited financial statements.” 608 Meyer’s warning is well-placed.
It is often noted that transparency in financials is an integral part of evaluating investments. 609
When an organization refuses to release records to potential investors, a warning light should go
off for all investors. As previously mentioned, Bennett refused to provide investors with any
information in addition to what was contained in the binder. This could be for a variety of
reasons−perhaps Bennett’s financial statements were not up to par or, more likely, Bennett did not
prepare any financial statements. In either situation, the lesson is the same. Investors should
carefully evaluate the available financial information, and if the necessary information is not readily
available, demand it.
Perhaps as a warning to those who have given Jim Bakker a second chance, this is an
important lesson. Upon a request for audited financial statements, Professor Steven Wizenburg
received a letter stating, “it means so much to Lori and me to hear from our friends. . . . We want
to be a blessing to you!” 610 What is glaringly omitted from the Bakkers’ response to Professor
Wizenburg’s request is the financial statement or any direction as to how to obtain such
information. Accordingly, investors and contributors may seek to demand more information
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d. Investigate when Things Seem “Fishy”
“Peter Dorbin, the Inquirer feature writer who wrote the April 16 story, said he heard
‘plenty of innuendo’ about the foundation. ‘There was no shortage of people who said this smells
fishy,’ he said. ‘What this story was short on was people who had facts.’” 611 As one of Jim
Bakker’s previous employees said after the fact, “We were wrong. I should have refused the kind
of salary I took . . . . We were so caught up in God’s work that we forgot about God. It took the
tragedy, the kick in the teeth, to bring us to our senses.” 612 As this quote indicates, early warning
signs were clearly in place, but people – both inside and outside of the organization – chose to
ignore them.
Be wary when an organization requires funds to be deposited directly with the firm. New
Era required that the deposits be placed directly with the institution rather than an autonomous
third-party or escrow. 613 Although New Era explained this “requirement” by stating that it used
the interest earned on the investments to cover day to day expenses, the interest earnings were not
reported on New Era’s tax returns. 614 This type of behavior seems “fishy.”
e. Research!
The SEC website has numerous warnings about possible scams. 615 Investors should check
the North American Securities Administrators Association’s (NASAA) Top 10 List of Frauds. 616
As of 2004, the number 1 on the Top Ten List of Frauds was Ponzi schemes, and number 5 was
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affinity group frauds. 617 Such frauds are schemes with a religious, professional, or ethnic focus and
the “fundraisers” claim to intend to help those groups. 618 Both federal and state governments have
tried to educate investors regarding Ponzis. 619 For example, the NASAA’s website contains an

Id. The list included: (1) Ponzi Schemes; (2) Senior Investment Fraud; (3) Promissory Notes; (4) Unscrupulous
Brokers; (5) Affinity Fraud; (6) Insurance Agent Securities Fraud; (7) Prime Bank/High-Yield Investment Schemes; (8)
Internet Fraud; (9) Mutual Fund Business Practices; and (10) Variable Annuities. See Deborah Bortner, Top Ten Frauds,
WASH. STATE DEPT. OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, Jan. 14, 2004 available at
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/sd/toptenfrauds_nr.htm.
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See generally North American Securities Administrators Association, Home Page, 2008,
http://www.nasaa.org/home/index.cfm. This website provides helpful information such as the following section
titled “Behind the Return of a Ponzi Scam:”
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Variety and Confusion Though the Ponzi scheme has been around for 89 years, it is more
prevalent today than ever before. The driving force behind this renaissance of the Ponzi swindle is the
recent explosion of financial services and often bewildering new investments available to the public.
In this crowded and fast-changing marketplace, Ponzi promoters have an increasing number of
“costumes” at their disposal with which to dress up their schemes and thwart detection. Ponzi scams
can involve almost any type of deal – generic drugs, clothing brokerages, hydroponics, windmills, gold
mines, diamonds, precious metals, foreign currency transactions, commodities, high-tech stocks or
speculative real estate
Greed The Ponzi scheme thrives on greed, which appears to explain why there always seems to be a
ready supply of investors eager to turn over their life savings. Rather than investing for the future,
victims are urged to cash in on a quick speculative scheme. Conservative, straight as an arrow
investors sometimes get caught up in Ponzi schemes after promoters dangle high rates of return such
as 18-20 percent over their heads.
A “Surefire Scheme” The bottom line of the Ponzi scheme is always the same: the attractive
above-market rate of return on your investment is guaranteed. Investors are lulled by the nonsensical
proposition that their investment is not at risk.
The Herd Instinct Frequently, Ponzi scam promoters rely completely on word of mouth to line up
new investors. To get this process going, the con operators often concentrate their initial efforts on
specific cities, types of investors, family members, church groups, professionals and social
acquaintances. This initial stage of the scheme has zeroed in on members of specific pro football
teams, Air Force bases and even law offices. This concentration on close knit groups often yields the
desired result: Initial victims unwittingly aid the swindler by lining up their closest friends, relatives
and professional associates as new victims.
The Appearance of Success Some initial investors in Ponzi scams are paid off handsomely, and
often with returns considerably higher than those originally promised. Frequently, this is the “hard”
proof that skeptical investors insist on seeing before they will jump in with both feet.
Fear Even as a Ponzi scheme starts to collapse, investors are slow to admit that they’ve been
swindled. Frequently, there is the fear that public exposure will create a crisis of confidence that
could create a run on the promoter and make things worse. There is also the fear of looking foolish
for being blinded by greed. The investor may fear that if his suspicions are wrong, he will be
drummed out of the high-interest scheme. And since the Ponzi scheme relies on a sense of
community, there is the fear that the first investor who breaks ranks will be blackballed in his
professional or social circles.
The Tooth Fairy Syndrome Investors in Ponzi schemes frequently cling to even the faintest of
hopes that everything will work out for the better. Even after Charles Ponzi was exposed, for
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audio recording entitled “Detecting and Avoiding Ponzi Schemes.” 620 The website also provides
lists of questions to ask, tips to protect yourself from conmen, and provides the “Investor’s Bill of
Rights.” 621 Perhaps even more helpful than the questions to ask or the Bill of Rights are the
warning signs for various scams. The website specifically provides warning sings to look for in
potential Ponzi schemes. 622 It states:
Here are basic rules to follow in steering clear of Ponzi schemes:

example, investors continued to press their funds on him, believing that his new global investment
syndicate would set everything straight. As one recent Ponzi scheme victim explained, “It was like
believing in the tooth fairy. I didn’t want to give up on the whole deal.” This brand of thinking has
resulted in investors attacking government officials and defending Ponzi promoters as heroes, saints
and misunderstood financial geniuses with basically good intentions. Frequently, an exposed Ponzi
operator will capitalize on these sentiments by stating that he got in over his head, telling investors
that he meant well, but that things just got out of hand. Or the Ponzi promoter may vow to make
good in one last venture, which may turn out to be nothing more than yet another Ponzi scheme.
Id. Thus, the NASAA provides lists of warning signs and the recipe for the textbook Ponzi. Investors should
review this information prior to trusting others with their money.
620
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Id. The Investor Bill of Rights states:
When You Invest, You Have the Right to:
Ask for and receive information from a firm about the work history and background of the person handling
your account, as well as information about the firm itself.
Receive complete information about the risks, obligations, and costs of any investment before investing.
Receive recommendations consistent with your financial needs and investment objectives.
Receive a copy of all completed account forms and agreements.
Receive account statements that are accurate and understandable.
Understand the terms and conditions of transactions you undertake.
Access your funds in a timely manner and receive information about any restrictions or limitations on
access.
Discuss account problems with the branch manager or compliance department of the firm and receive
prompt attention to and fair consideration of your concerns.
Receive complete information about commissions, sales charges, maintenance or service charges,
transaction or redemption fees, and penalties.
Contact your state or provincial securities agency in order to verify the employment and disciplinary
history of a securities salesperson and the salesperson`s firm; find out if the investment is permitted to be
sold; or file a complaint.
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Beware promises of high, guaranteed profits. This is perhaps the easiest way to
spot a Ponzi scam. Any legitimate investment involves a degree of risk that makes it
impossible to flatly promise profits, much less astronomical returns.
Avoid promoters who fail to provide clear and detailed explanations. Don’t
listen to promoters who tell you that it is impossible to explain their deal in layman’s
terms. Many investors fail to seek even the most rudimentary basic understanding of
the investment they are making.
Check out the promoter’s background. Check with your state, provincial, or
territorial securities office for licensing/registration of the individuals selling the
investment. Remember, anyone selling a security must have a license. If the
promoter says he’s exempt, follow-up with your regulator to confirm the claim.
Get information from your state or provincial securities regulator. Since most
Ponzi schemes involve investment contracts, they should be registered as securities
offerings with your state, provincial, or territorial securities division. If the
promotion appears to be in violation of state securities law, turn over all information
on the case in your possession to securities regulators.
Ask for detailed information in writing. Any investor is within his rights when
insisting on detailed information from a promoter seeking large sums of money. Ask
for information on the company, its officers and financial track record. If a product
is involved in the deal, ask for documentation on its cost, fair market value, and
existing and potential markets. Frequently, Ponzi promoters rely on nothing more
than fast talk and official-looking promissory notes when investors sign over their
funds. Reluctance to provide detailed information should be regarded as a red flag
of a potential Ponzi scheme.
Verify the promoter’s claims. Remember that seeing is believing. Be skeptical of
deals that can’t be checked out in person. When it comes to checking on details of
your investment, be particularly leery of claims that all banking transactions and
bookkeeping are handled in remote cities or other countries. Searching the internet
is another way to verify the investment deal. If you do not have a home computer,
your local library has internet access available to the public. Investors are sometimes
told that certain information is being kept “secret” for security purposes.
Resist pressure to reinvest without seeing your “profits.” Ponzi schemes often
are kept going for substantial periods of time by promoters who convince even initial
investors to roll-over their “profits” for even greater returns. While it frequently
makes sense to stay with a legitimate investment over time, be suspicious of
promoters who are reluctant to let you cash in your gains.
Look for unbusiness-like conduct or disruption of services. Reluctant to have
their schemes exposed, few Ponzi operators enlist much, if any, office help, and may
even go to the extreme of answering the phone and opening all the mail themselves.
This has the effect of hastening the collapse of the Ponzi scheme, since it makes it
even more difficult for one person to keep up with all the required payments and
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investor contacts. And when the Ponzi bubble is about to burst, promoters typically
become extremely difficult to reach. 623
These resources are freely available to the public and should be utilized. If investors are
skeptical about a particular investment, they should use the resources listed on the website to
ask someone who is more knowledgeable about potential schemes.
f. Old Habits Die Hard – Beware of Bennett upon Release.
As the old adage goes, “old habits die hard.” If someone is accustomed to doing
something one way, convincing them to do it another way may prove difficult. Though no
concrete evidence is available stating that Bennett has not “rehabilitated” himself while in prison,
investors should be wary of him upon his release. Although this may seem like common sense,
apparently investors are not quick to learn.
For example, take Jim Bakker’s incredible story. He served years in prison. 624 During his
time served, Bakker wrote a book entitled I Was Wrong: The Untold Story of the Shocking Journey from
PTL Power to Prison and Beyond, in which he details how sorry he is for the scam. 625 However, his
actions seem quite different from his apologetic book. Shortly after his release from prison,
Bakker returned to the air on The Jim Bakker Show. 626 One might think that Bakker would choose a
different angle given how many investors he burned with the PTL scandal, but he did not. 627 He
continues his televangelism, and, perhaps even more shockingly, his fundraising. 628 Though
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Bakker was banned from fundraising during his probation, as soon as the restriction was lifted, he
quickly began seeking donations. 629
He resorts to statements similar to those he used while doing the “PTL Club” 25
years earlier, such as “Our ministry is going through life and death and we only
have a few hours left” or “I’m fighting the worst battle of my life today” or “We
need a miracle desperately . . . I need 1000 people to give $100 to keep us alive.”
He has come up with gimmicks like the “debtbusters club” and is selling little
crystal crosses for $25. In one fundraising segment he was filmed outside on a hill
of rocks, showing how he couldn’t move himself. The[n] he later brought a pile of
ricks into the studio and proved to people he needed their help to move them. He
offers excuses such as “I’ve had a hard time raising money because of the past” or
“I’ve been grieving so much over our problems I’ve been physically ill.” Instead of
seeing himself as causing a problem, he sees the lack of viewer support as being the
problem.
***
Ironically, Bakker loves to complain about “arrogant, ego-centric” believers, yet he
fails to see that almost every time he opens his mouth it’s to either proclaim a
unique revelation God has given him or to coerce others into getting him out of
the financial messes he gets himself into. While claiming to be Christ-centered, the
program is really Bakker-centered. For his 65th birthday he spent 15 minutes
reading from his book “I Was Wrong” (bragging of the surprise birthday party his
fellow convicts gave him that included stolen food) before offering the book to
viewers for a “birthday gift” contribution of $65. He uses a type of false modesty
to ask for money by proclaiming, “I didn’t think anybody’d watch Jim Bakker
again” with a tear in his eye while bragging that a station owner told him Bakker’s
show is the second-highest rated on the station. His words may reflect a bit more
humility, but the attitude is still very self-serving. 630
Amazingly, the Jim Bakker show is still on air and surviving.
Thus, even though it may seem like common sense to doubt Bennett if he attempts
to return to philanthropic fundraising after his prison term, perhaps contributors should be
reminded. As is evidenced by the Bakker example, the “forgive and forget” philosophy is
629
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alive and well among philanthropic investors. However, investors should be wary of
making the same mistake twice. As another old adage goes, “fool me once, shame on you;
fool me twice, shame on me.”
g. If it sounds too good to be true, it probably is.
Ultimately, the lesson is this – if something sounds too good to be true, it more than likely is
too good to be true. “Anyone who tells you that you can make huge amounts of money with very
little investment, very little risk and very little work, is almost certainly not telling you the truth.” 631
“[T]here are no guarantees [in life] and high rewards only come with high risk.” 632 Bennett offered
extremely high rates of return to investors. However, “[m]ost legitimate businesses cannot sustain
levels of profitability required to service and retire Ponzi scheme capital.” 633 Such was clearly the
case with New Era.
As with all Ponzi schemes, Bennett needed ever increasing amounts of capital to perpetuate
his plan. By paying off the initial wave of investors with the funds obtained from the secondary
wave of investors and so on, this plan worked for far too long. Investors should have researched
the “investments.” Bennett told investors that the funds were “invested” in t-bills that were held
by Prudential. However, t-bills offer nowhere near the returns that Bennett promised investors.
He tried to explain this inconsistency by stating that the anonymous donors pledged to “match”
the donations. However, even charitable donors have a limit. Bennett never explained the “cut
off” for the anonymous donors. As such, these gaps in information should have signaled to
investors that something seemed “fishy.”
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“For harried development directors and ministry leaders, New Era was a dream come true –
until, just three years after its promising beginnings, the dream became a nightmare.” 634 “We can
all remember that nothing worthwhile comes easy.” 635 Although many failed to read the warnings,
at least one potential investor chose to not invest with New Era because he did not understand the
economics involved in New Era’s funds matching program. 636 When the New Era Ponzi
unraveled, Mr. Scott responded by saying, “Holy cat . . . Isn’t it wonderful we were too stupid to
participate? My God, it’s astonishing. Originally when we looked at it, we didn’t understand the
economics, and therefore, when we don’t understand something, we tend to avoid it.” 637
Ironically, Mr. Scott’s “stupidity” saved him from becoming one of Bennett’s victims.
Perhaps investors should always ask themselves why someone would offer them such an
amazing deal. If the deal is “exclusive” and only those who are chosen are entitled to participate,
perhaps the investor should ask himself why he was chosen. If the deal returns are so incredible,
why does the offerer of the fabulous returns need you rather than another donor to invest?
Though this may seem like a very skeptical question to ask oneself, skepticism may be well-placed
when determining where to invest your money.
Interestingly, evangelicals and Christian philanthropies sought religious reasons to continue
giving. 638 As Steve Wulf, a journalist with Time magazine, noted, “Bennett’s secret was that he was
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able to marry two powerful but seemingly contradictory human instincts: greed and charity.” 639
Greed is a key factor in perpetuating a Ponzi because the desire to obtain the high rates of return
blinds investors to questioning the investment. “Ponzi schemes have a larcenous elegance.
They’re kind of financial alchemy, promising to turn basic human impulses like greed, trust, and
fear into piles of cash.” 640 As two scholars have explained:
A Ponzi operator’s pitch to investors will typically not withstand even the most
perfunctory due diligence by the investor. Therefore, the key for the Ponzi
operator is to get people to invest without asking too many questions.
To accomplish this, the Ponzi operator will typically do two things – first, offer
extremely high rates of return, then actually pay such returns to earlier investors.
This creates a level of temptation (the so called “greed-factor”) that is exploited to
assure a steady stream of new investors. A Ponzi operation will therefore usually
involve extremely high rates of return over short periods of time and at least an
initial pool of lucky investors who actually rake in these high returns. 641
As such, Bennet’s New Era plan was a classic Ponzi scheme. Had investors realized this,
perhaps the scheme would not have gotten as out of hand as it did. Accordingly, investors
should avoid letting the greed factor blind them from seeing the obvious.
VI.

Conclusion
Perhaps John G. Bennett will simply become another Jim Bakker. The lack of outrage

about the supposedly philanthropic organization duping millions of investors is nothing short of
amazing. But Christian investors and philanthropists continually follow the “turn the other cheek”
philosophy and come back for more. 642 As one investor opined, “[i]t’s better to be in the game

relying on the double-funds promised for certain projects. Id. The failing pyramid “seriously curtailed” some of the
initiatives that had been set in motion. Id.
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and take your risks than not to be in the game at all.” 643 Some investors have not given up faith:
“as Christians we dare not become cynical [and] we must continue to trust each other. We must
believe that our yes means yes and our no means no.” 644 “Bennett still asserts that he never stole
anything and he says he retains a sincere Christian faith.” 645
Regardless of what individual victims or investors may feel, it seems as though a lesson
from Property I should apply to choosing an investment. Caveat emptor. Investors should be wary
of the organizations to which they entrust their money. Although everything is 20/20 in hindsight,
the warning signs seemingly screamed to New Era investors that something was not quite right. In
short, perhaps we should all take a lesson from General Patton: “Take calculated risks. That is
quite different than being rash.” 646 In sum, “[g]etting something for nothing means just that – the
scam artist gets your money and you get NOTHING.” 647

someone wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. If someone forces you
to go one mile, go with him two miles. Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the
one who wants to borrow from you.
Matthew 5:38-42. Additionally, the gospel of Luke provides a similar lesson:
But I tell you who hear me: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who
curse you, pray for those who mistreat you. If someone strikes you on one cheek, turn to him the
other also. If someone takes your cloak, do not stop him from taking your tunic. Give to everyone
who asks you, and if anyone takes what belongs to you, do not demand it back. Do to others as you
would have them do to you.
Luke 6:27-32.
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